Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties

I: Origins and Contexts.- Factors Shaping the Growth of Business Associations and their Involvement in Political Finance.- A. The Expansion of Associations and their Political Roles in the Setting of Industrializing Societies.- Associational Membership and Commitment.- Unions, Employers and the State.- Articulation Styles.- B. Types of Political Support Chanelling Structures and their Utilization by Entrepreneurs.- Conveyers, Sponsors and Parallel Action Organizations.- Loyalties to Parties and Associations.- II: Germany.- How German Business Associations Came to Innovate Manifold Political Finance Techniques.- A. A Historical Pattern of Rivalry Between Parties and Associations.- 1. The Cartel Tradition and the Role of Associations in Social and Political Mobilization.- The Emergence of Peak Associations.- The Repression of Labor’s Political Organizations.- Working-Class Patterns of Political Finance.- Prototypes for Political Financing by Business.- 2. Conveyers, Sponsors and Parallel Action Organizations as Coalition-Mongers in Wilhelmine Germany.- The Reichsverband Against Social Democracy.- The Industrial Election Fund.- The Hansabund.- 3. Business Associations as Shapers of Entrepreneurial Ideologies Before and After the Third Reich.- An “Industrial Nobility”.- Heterogeneous Weimar Party Finance Patterns.- Stresemann’s Experience.- Entrepreneurs as a Post-war Political Elite.- B. The Business Conveyers as Coalition-Reinforcers of the Adenauer Era and the Reasons for their Decline.- 1. The Peak Industry and Business Associations as Founders of the Complex Conveyer Systems of the 1950’s.- The Attitudes of the Parties.- Business Association Discipline.- The BDI’s Leadership Role.- The Offensive Nature of Conveyer Goals.- Quota-Setting and Collections.- 2. The High Utility of Financial Resources in the Shaping of German Voting Behavior during the Adenauer Era.- The Tax-favored “Civic” Conveyers.- The “Family” of Coalition Support-Channellers.- The Voters’ Predispositions.- Adenauers’ Campaign Successes.- How Conveyer Funds were Invested.- 3. The Widening Rift Between Conveyers and Parties and the Resort to the State Finance Alternative.- The Position of the Minor Party Leaders.- Conveyers and Party Secretaries.- Demands on Ministers.- The Introduction of State Subsidies.- 4. The Embattled Public Subsidies and their Conversion into Support Pillars of the Post-Erhard CDU-SPD Coalition.- Control Techniques.- The Pyramiding of State Finances.- The Attack on the Constitutionality of State Finance.- Party Finance Formulas and the Grand Coalition.- III: Norway.- Why Norwegian Business Associations Have Generally Avoided Political Finance Roles.- A. A Historical Pattern of Intense but Limited Associational Activity.- 1. Industrialization in a Context of Early Franchise Extension and Associational Development.- Mutual Acceptance of the Peak Associations.- The Unions’ Tradition of Solidarity.- 2. Class Conflicts and Business’ Political Role During the Interwar Period of Party System Instability.- Alliance-Building by the Left.- Traditions of Investment Channelling.- The Fedrelandslaget.- Decentralized Party Finance.- Support Transfer Limits.- 3. Political Socialization Patterns and Values of Norwegian Entrepreneurs.- Early Reactions against Employers’ Abuse of Powers.- Businessmen and Labour’s Economic Policies.- Keeping Organizational Power Latent.- B. The Contemporary Experiences of Libert as as an Exception that Proves the Rule.- 1. The Founding of Libertas in 1947 and the Circumstances of Its Retreat from a Conveyer Role.- The Reticence of the Peak Associations.- The Shipowners’ Initiative.- Libertas’ Activities.- Labour Prompts an Official Investigation.- Libertas Discontinues Party Finance.- 2. The Low Utility of Financial Supports in the Context of Party Mobilization and Recruitment Processes.- Strength of the Party Press.- Inexpensive Campaign Techniques.- Party Defenses Against Outsiders.- Ultra-Stable Voting Patterns.- 3. Libertas’ Ambitious “Parallel-Action” Activities and Resulting Conflicts With Party Leaders.- Trends in Party Membership.- Expenditures by the Parties and Libertas.- Aid and Discomfort for the Conservatives.- De Lange’s Call for “The Will to Power”.- 4. Libertas’ Indirect Contributions Toward Reintroducing Effective Competition to Norwegian Politics.- The Impact of Cross-Pressures.- Labour’s Achilles’ Heel.- Disclosure and Party Finance.- Labour’s Loss of the 1965 Elections.- Forming the Coalition.- IV: Japan.- How Even a Giant Conveyer is Limited in its Impact on Japanese Party Politics by the Timidity of the Self-Effacing Entrepreneur.- A. The Historical Pattern of Japanese Business Behavior in Associations.- 1. Slow Development of the Japanese Associational Structure Is Due to Conscious Reliance on Informal Dependency Relations.- Early Business Associations.- Early Labor Associations.- Government Intervention.- 2. Entrepreneurs Reincorporate Some Feudal Practices in the Most Modern Business Organization.- Organic View of Society.- Feudal Carryover.- Concentration Pattern.- Investment Channeling.- Intra-Organizational Relationships.- 3. The Big Zaibatsu Combines Tend to Dominate the Political As Well As the Economic Organization of Business.- Traditional Nature of Political Financing.- Leader-Maintenance Groups.- Zaibatsu Sponsors.- Parallel Action Organization.- Anachronism of Business behavior.- 4. Political Socialization Makes the Leading Entrepreneurs Take A Diffident Self-Effacing Role in Party Politics.- Youthful Experiences.- Young Adult Experiences.- Middle Age Experiences.- Later Middle Age Experiences.- Present Attitudes.- B. The Contemporary Experience of More Higly Specialized Business Organization.- 1. The Federation of Economic Organizations Establishes a Money Conveyer to Finance Greater Conservative Party Unity and Strength.- The Limited Role of Postwar Business Associations.- The Weakness of Labor Associations.- The Alarming Decline of the Pro-Business Conservatives After Independence.- Business Establishes a Conveyer to Finance Conservative Union.- 2. The Failure of the Kondankai Financing to Change Political Attitudes and behavior.- Party Financing by the Small Japanese Sponsors and Conveyers.- The Kondankai’s Financing Is Too Influenced by Existing Methods.- Use of Conveyer Funds.- The Questionable Utility of the Conveyer at Its Height.- 3. Conveyer Support Produces Only Formal Party Unity Rather Than a United and Popular Conservative Party.- Business Pressure For Party Union and Reform in 1955.- Hesitant Business Intervention in Party Leadership.- Kondankai Stops Short of Bringing Internal Party Unity.- New Method of Party Financing Replaces the Kondankai.- 4. The Limitations of the Conveyer Illuminate the Weakness of the Japanese Party System.- Separation of the Spheres of State and Economy.- The Weakness of Disclosure and Electoral Laws.- The Provocative Financial Relations of Parties and Business.- V: Comparative Analyses.- How National Party and Interest Group Patterns Affected the Efficacy and Viability of Conveyers.- A. Factors Affecting Involvement of the Associational Tiers and the Participation of Member Firms.- Varying Support Transfer Models.- “Defensive” and “Offensive” Goals.- Membership Solidarity.- Peak Association Involvement.- B. Characteristics of Electorates and Persuasion Techniques Which Shaped the Utility of Financial Supports.- Sources of Party Campaign Supports.- The Partisan Identification of Voters.- Political Communication Techniques.- The Political Cultures.- The Effective German Conveyers.- C. Coalition “Costs” Which Led Various Party Elites to Reevaluate the Conveyer Arrangement.- The Coalition Leaders.- The Minor Party (Faction) Leaders.- Ministers and Parliamentarians.- The Party Managers.- The Public Relations Men.