I. Nature.- I. The Problem of the Exact Sciences.- II: Mathematics and Nature.- (1) The consistency ofBerkeley’s philosophy.- (2) Berkeley’s critique of the received mathematical philosophy of Nature.- (3) The immaterialist principle.- (4) The rejection of Enthusiasm and Scepticism.- (5) Appearance is reality.- (6) The status of the esse percipi principle.- (7) Common sense realism.- (8) No primary/secondary quality bifurcation.- (9) The rejection of “matter”.- (10) The source of the current errors.- (11) Cosmos.- (12) Nature is essentially qualitative.- (13) The operative function of mathematics and physics.- (14) The employment of number.- (15) The employment of geometry.- (16) The function of natural philosophy.- (17) Renovating the sciences.- (18) Some modern discussions bearing on the esse percipi principle.- III. The Anthropocentric Character of Space, Time, and Motion.- (1) The levels of treatment.- (2) Relative and Absolute.- (3) Berkeley’s various aims.- (4) The perplexities of false abstraction.- (5) Visual Perception.- (6) The interweaving of sensible extension time and motion with other sensations.- (7) Public standards of space, time, and motion.- (8) The Selection of Standards.- (9) Primary and Secondary Qualities.- (10) The liberation of space, time, and motion.- IV. The Analogy of the Grammar of Nature.- (1) Signs and visual language.- (2) The consistent working of Nature.- (3) The Grammar of Nature.- (4) A hierarchy of knowledge.- (5) The employment of the grammar of Nature.- (6) Our knowledge of natural grammar is imperfect and incomplete.- (7) The rigidity of the grammar of Nature, and the flexibility of the language of Nature.- (8) The teleological universe.- (9) The liberation of thought achieved by Berkeley.- II. Common Sense.- V. Berkeley’s Intentions.- (1) The Unity of Berkeley’s career.- (2) “A gentleman and man of sense”.- (3) Redeeming the time.- (4) External and internal criticism.- (5) The danger of premature system.- VI. The two Kinds of Metaphysics.- (1) Berkeley’s allegiance to common sense.- (2) Metaphysics v common opinion.- (3) Common sense and metaphysics.- (4) Plato as the prototype.- (5) Berkeley and Plato.- VII. Philosophical Scruples: Their Cause and Cure.- (1) Scruples as the bane of philosophy.- (2) The absurd.- (3) The sceptical philosophy and its critics.- (4) Ambiguities in the sceptical philosophy.- (5) Berkeley and Hume: the capacity of the human understanding.- (6) Berkeley and the modern therapeutic analysts.- VIII. The Rôle of Common Sense.- (1) The defence of common sense.- (2) Berkeley’s appreciation of common sense.- (3) Berkeley’s discovery of common sense.- (4) Berkeley’s statements about the role of common sense.- (5) Recourse to the vulgar.- IX. The Potentiality of Common Sense.- (1) The adamantine core of common sense.- (2) Common sense as inchoate wisdom.- (3) Common sense as intelligence and ius naturale.- (4) Making a cosmos.- (5) Does Berkeley do justice to common sense?.- (6) Common sense and anthropocentricity.- (7) Privacy and Society.- X. Berkeley’s Dialectic.- (1) All things to all men.- (2) Is Berkeley a sceptic?.- (3) Paradox.- (4) Emergence from tribe.- (5) Berkeley as rhetorician.- (6) Remembrance of old things.- (7) Berkeley as metaphysician.- III. Mystery.- XI. The Mysterious Universe.- (1) Berkeley as hierophant.- (2) The change of mood.- (3) Education.- (4) Berkeley as a charismatic.- XII. The Exact Sciences.- (1) The power of myths.- (2) “Hypotheses non fingo”.- (3) An interim analysis.- (4) The inside view.
