Material Ethics of Value: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann

<p>Chapter One: The Idea of a Material Value-Ethics. </p><p>a. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann.</p><p>b. The difficulties facing efforts at a synthesis of Scheler and Hartmann’s moral theories.</p><p>c. The Character of material value-ethics.</p><p>d. The aims of material value-ethics.</p><p>e. Passing beyond Kant.</p><p>f. Prospects of material value-ethics.</p><p>Chapter Two: The Phenomenology of Value.</p><p>a. Nature and aims of phenomenology. </p><p>b. Scheler’s distinctive phenomenological procedure. </p><p>c. Husserl’s theory of value. </p><p>d. Scheler’s phenomenology of values. </p>e. The stratification of the emotional life. <p><p>f. The order of values. </p><p>g. Values and norms. </p><p>Chapter Three: The Orientation of Human Beings toward Value. </p><p>a. The aspiration to systematic philosophy. </p><p>b. Anthropological foundations of the human openness to values. </p><p>c. Human freedom. </p><p>d. Conclusions. </p><p>Chapter Four: Values and Moral Values. </p><p>c. Relational oppositions among values. </p><p>d. Qualitative and quantitative oppositions. </p><p>d. Values that condition contents. </p><p>e. Goods as values. </p><p>e. Laws that condition content. </p><p>Chapter Five: Action Theory and the Problem of Motivation. </p><p>a. The problem of action. </p><p>b. Hartmann’s action theory. </p><p>c. Scheler’s critique of Kant’s concept of action. </p><p>d. The general structure of action. </p><p>e. The essential phenomenology of action. </p><p>f. Consequences for moral judgment. </p><p>g. Moral motivation. </p><p>Chapter Six: Goodness and Moral Obligation. </p><p>a. Values and norms. </p><p>b. The negativity of obligation. </p><p>c. The phenomenology of obligation. </p><p>d. Moral authority and education. </p><p>e.  The contribution of Dietrich von Hildebrand to the problem of obligation. </p><p>f. Love and obligation. </p><p>g. The relativity and universality of obligation. </p><p>h. Obligation in Husserl. </p><p>i. The structure and limits of moral autonomy in Scheler. </p><p>Chapter Seven: The Concept of Virtue and Its Foundations. </p><p>a. The conflict of reason and emotion in Scheler. </p><p>b. The essential phenomenology of virtue. </p><p>c. Von Hildebrand on virtue. </p><p>d. Virtue theory in Husserl. </p><p>e. Hartmann: The moral context of  virtue. </p><p>Chapter Eight: Virtue Ethics. </p><p>a. The Platonic virtues. </p><p>b. The Aristotelian virtues. </p><p>d. The Christian virtues. </p><p>e. Modernity: The third order of values. </p><p>f. The structure of the realm of value. </p><p>Chapter Nine: The Phenomenology of the Person. </p><p>a. Personhood in Scheler. </p><p>b. Hartmann’s critique of Scheler’s concept of the person. </p><p>Chapter Ten: Ethical Personalism.</p><p>a. Hartmann's ethical personalism. </p><p>b. Scheler’s ethical personalism. </p><p>c. Scheler on the person in a moral setting. </p><p>d. The intimate person and personal love. </p><p>e. Models and leaders. </p><p>f. Material value-ethics and the good life. </p><p>g. The problem of the unity of the table of values revisited. </p>