I. Philosopher of Method.- 1. Dewey’s view of philosophy.- 2. Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of knowledge.- 3. Dewey’s emphasis on method in ethics, social philosophy, education, religion, and logic.- a. Ethics.- b. Social philosophy.- c. Education.- d. Religion.- e. Logic.- Conclusion.- II. Method and the Instrumentalist View of Man.- 1. Dewey’s description of the empirical method.- a. The distinction between primary and secondary experience.- b. The ambiguity of “primary experience”.- c. The incompatibility of Dewey’s two conceptions of primary experience.- 2. Dewey’s philosophical starting point: man’s primary experience as a unity of activity, undifferentiated by thought-distinctions.- 3. Dewey’s instrumentalist view of man and its relationship to his recommendation of the empirical method.- a. Man as problem-solver and instrumentalist thinker.- b. Man as social.- c. Man as moral.- Conclusion.- III. Scientific Foundations of the Instrumentalist View of Man.- 1. Biology.- 2. Psychology.- 3. Social theories.- a. General background: Comte, Hegel, Bacon, and Concorcet.- b. Empirical support from the social sciences.- (1) Anthropology.- (2) Sociology and social psychology: the stimulus of Mead, Small, and Thomas.- Conclusion.- IV. The Instrumentalist View of the World.- 1. Dewey’s view of metaphysics.- 2. Dewey’s view of the world.- a. Change, plurality, and contingency.- b. Naturalism vs. supernaturalism.- 3. Nature and empirical method.- V. Change.- 1. Structure and process.- 2. Dewey’s view as an alternative to the quest for substance and essence.- 3. The dual role of events.- a. Events as the uninterpreted data of immediate experience.- b. Events as the ultimate constituents of nature.- c. A dilemma reflecting opposing tendencies in Dewey’s thought.- VI. Contingency.- 1. Dewey’s reasons for believing that there is contingency in nature.- a. Direct support.- (1) Testimony of unsophisticated experience.- (2) Biology: The theory of evolution.- (3) Physics: Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy.- b. Indirect support.- (1) Contingency as a condition of fundamental distinctions.- (2) Contingency as a condition of experienced world features.- (3) Contingency as a condition of the phases in human behavior.- (4) Contingency as a condition for the employment of scientific method.- 2. Further clarification of Dewey’s case for contingency and assessment of its significance.- a. Difficulties in ascertaining the meaning of “contingency”.- b. Human freedom, choice, and responsibility.- c. The meaning of “contingency” in decision-making contexts.- d. Some limits to Dewey’s views when considered in judicial and investigative contexts.- e. Conclusion.- VII. Knowledge.- 1. Dewey’s attack on the spectator view of knowledge.- a. The instrumentalist view of thought.- b. Experimental methods of inquiry.- c. Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy.- 2. Dewey’s view of knowledge: its applications and limits.- a. Experimental types of knowing.- b. Non-experimental types of knowing.- c. Conclusion.- VIII. Toward a Broader Empiricism.- 1. Review of themes and difficulties in Dewey’s philosophy.- 2. The quest for essence.
