Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

1. Introduction.- I: The Game Theoretic Analysis.- 2. Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information.- 2.1 The Two-Person Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.- 2.2 Two-Person Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information.- 3. The Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies.- 3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.- 3.2 The Case of No Discounting.- 3.3 The Expected Equilibrium Payoffs.- II: The Game Playing Experiment.- 4. Related Bargaining Experiments.- 4.1 Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information.- 4.2 Fairness in Bargaining.- 5. The Experimental Design.- 5.1 Technical Conditions.- 5.2 The Experimental Design.- 5.3 Notes on the Evaluation of the Experiment.- 6. The Agreement Outcomes.- 6.1 Hypotheses on the Agreement Outcomes.- 6.2 The Agreement Outcomes.- 6.3 The Prominence Level.- 6.4 Verification of the Hypotheses.- 6.5 Asymmetry in the Agreement Outcomes of two Weak Players.- 6.6 Descriptive Theories of the Agreement Outcomes.- 6.7 Average Payoff and Expected Payoff in Equilibrium.- 7. Break Offs.- 7.1 Conflict Frequencies.- 7.2 Break Offs by the Weak Player.- 7.3 Break Offs by the Strong Player.- 7.4 Immediate Break Offs.- 7.5 Agreements under similar Circumstances.- 8, Further Aspects.- 8.1 The Initial Demands.- 8.2 Length of Bargaining.- 8.3 Incentive Compatibility.- 8.4 Revelation by the Weak Player.- 8.5 Altruism.- 9. The Bargaining Process.- 9.1 Models of the Bargaining Process.- 9.2 The Concession Behavior in the Bargaining Process.- 9.3 The Bargaining Process in Games with ?.- 10. Individual Adaptation to Experience.- 10.1 Qualitative Description of the Adaptation.- 10.2 Quantitative Aspects of the Adaptation.- 11. A Picture of the Subjects’ Behavior.- 11.1 Stylized Facts.- 11.2 A Qualitative Picture of Subjects’ Behavior.- III: The Strategy Experiment.- 12. The Strategy Experiment.- 12.1 Organization of the Strategy Experiment.- 12.2 Results of the Game Playing Sessions.- 12.3 Results of the Group Tournaments.- 12.4 Results of the Final Tournament.- 13. Typicalness of the Final Strategies.- 13.1 Measuring the Typicalness of Behavior.- 13.2 Notes on the Evaluation of the Typicalness.- 13.3 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=30.- 13.4 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=45.- 13.5 Typicalness of the Final Strategy for ?=60.- 13.6 A Picture of the Typical Strategy.- 14. An Evolutionary Tournament.- 14.1 The Evolutionary Approach.- 14.2 Results of the Evolutionary Tournament.- 14.3 Fitness and Typicity.- 15. Summary and Conclusions.- Appendix A. Instructions of the Game Playing Experiment.- Appendix B. Statistical Tests.- References.