Dewey's Philosophy of Science

<div>Introduction</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 1. Experience</div><div>1.1. The Semantic Identity Thesis</div><div>1.2. Experience as Life-Behavior</div><div>1.3. Experience as Method</div><div>1.4. Forms of Experience</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 2. Language</div><div>2.1. Language as Activity: A Shift of Paradigm</div><div>2.2. Significance and Meaning</div><div>2.3. Semantic Externalism and Practical Agreement</div><div>2.4. Dewey’s Pragmatist Account of Concepts</div><div>2.5. Common Sense and Scientific Concepts</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 3. Inquiry</div><div>3.1. The Biological Basis of Inquiry</div><div>3.2. The Internal Conditions of Inquiry</div><div>3.3. The Normativity of the Situation</div><div>3.4. Truth and Warranted Assertibility</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 4. Construction</div><div>4.1. How are Synthetic Judgments Possible?</div><div>4.2. The Construction of Evidence</div><div>4.3. The Constitutive Function of the A Priori</div><div>4.4. The Construction of Objectivity</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 5. Realism</div><div>5.1. Reichenbach’s Interpretation and Dewey’s Reply</div><div>5.2. Dewey, the Structural Realist</div><div>5.3. Is Dewey’s a Structural Realist?</div><div>5.4. Dewey’s Expressivist Realism</div>