Israel (Harvard University, USA) Scheffler,
I Scheffler
John Wiley & Sons
e druk, 2009
9781405191708
Worlds of Truth – A Philosophy of Knowledge
A Philosophy of Knowledge
Specificaties
Gebonden, 168 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
e druk, 2009
ISBN13: 9781405191708
Rubricering
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 16 werkdagen
Samenvatting
Worlds of Truth: A Philosophy of Knowledge explicates and builds upon a half century of philosophical work by the noted philosopher Israel Scheffler.
Propounds a new doctrine of plurealism which maintains the existence of multiple real worlds
Offers a defense of absolute truth, which denies certainty and eschews absolutism, and defends systematic relativity, objectivity, and fallibilism
Emphasizes a wide range of pragmatic interests: epistemology and scientific development, cognition and emotion, science and ethics, ritual and culture, and art and science
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
<p>Preface viii</p>
<p>Acknowledgments x</p>
<p>Introduction 1</p>
<p>Part I: Inquiry 5</p>
<p>Chapter 1: Justification 7</p>
<p>1. Beliefs 7</p>
<p>2. Access to truth 8</p>
<p>3. Cogito ergo sum 9</p>
<p>4. Mathematical certainty 11</p>
<p>5. Classical logic 12</p>
<p>6. C. I. Lewis empiricism 14</p>
<p>7. Access as a metaphor 17</p>
<p>8. J. F. Fries and K. Popper 18</p>
<p>9. Voluntarism and linearity 19</p>
<p>10. One–way justification 20</p>
<p>11. Beginning in the middle 21</p>
<p>12. Justification, contextual and comparative 22</p>
<p>13. Justification in the empirical sciences 23</p>
<p>14. Circularity versus linearity 25</p>
<p>15. Democratic controls 25</p>
<p>16. Interactionism 27</p>
<p>Chapter 2: Truth 30</p>
<p>1. Allergy to absolute truth 31</p>
<p>2. Provisionality and truth 32</p>
<p>3. Truth versus verification 34</p>
<p>4. Truth and fixity 36</p>
<p>5. Transparency, Tarski, and Carnap 38</p>
<p>6. Truth and certainty 42</p>
<p>7. Sentences as truth candidates 44</p>
<p>8. Theoretical terms 44</p>
<p>9. Varieties of instrumentalism 45</p>
<p>10. Pragmatism and instrumentalism 45</p>
<p>11. Systems, simplicity, reduction 46</p>
<p>12. Crises in science 51</p>
<p>13. Reduction and expansion 52</p>
<p>Chapter 3: Worlds 55</p>
<p>1. Philosophies of truth 55</p>
<p>2. Operationism and truth 57</p>
<p>3. Version–dependence 59</p>
<p>4. Differences among scientifically oriented philosophers 61</p>
<p>5. Monism, pluralism, plurealism 62</p>
<p>6. Realism versus irrealism 66</p>
<p>7. A theory of everything 72</p>
<p>8. The status of ethics 75</p>
<p>9. Emotive theories; Ayer and Stevenson 75</p>
<p>10. Moore s ethical intuitionism 77</p>
<p>11. Dewey and ethical naturalism 79</p>
<p>12. Symbol, reference, and ritual 81</p>
<p>Part II: Related Pragmatic Themes 93</p>
<p>Chapter 4: Belief and Method 95</p>
<p>Introduction 95</p>
<p>1. Problems of pragmatism and pragmatic responses 98</p>
<p>2. Peirce s theory of belief, doubt, and inquiry 102</p>
<p>3. Peirce s comparison of methods 104</p>
<p>4. Difficulties in Peirce s treatment 106</p>
<p>5. An epistemological interpretation 108</p>
<p>6. The primacy of method 109</p>
<p>Chapter 5: Action and Commitment 114</p>
<p>Chapter 6: Emotion and Cognition 125</p>
<p>1. Emotions in the service of cognition 126</p>
<p>2. Cognitive emotions 132</p>
<p>Index 143</p>
<p>Acknowledgments x</p>
<p>Introduction 1</p>
<p>Part I: Inquiry 5</p>
<p>Chapter 1: Justification 7</p>
<p>1. Beliefs 7</p>
<p>2. Access to truth 8</p>
<p>3. Cogito ergo sum 9</p>
<p>4. Mathematical certainty 11</p>
<p>5. Classical logic 12</p>
<p>6. C. I. Lewis empiricism 14</p>
<p>7. Access as a metaphor 17</p>
<p>8. J. F. Fries and K. Popper 18</p>
<p>9. Voluntarism and linearity 19</p>
<p>10. One–way justification 20</p>
<p>11. Beginning in the middle 21</p>
<p>12. Justification, contextual and comparative 22</p>
<p>13. Justification in the empirical sciences 23</p>
<p>14. Circularity versus linearity 25</p>
<p>15. Democratic controls 25</p>
<p>16. Interactionism 27</p>
<p>Chapter 2: Truth 30</p>
<p>1. Allergy to absolute truth 31</p>
<p>2. Provisionality and truth 32</p>
<p>3. Truth versus verification 34</p>
<p>4. Truth and fixity 36</p>
<p>5. Transparency, Tarski, and Carnap 38</p>
<p>6. Truth and certainty 42</p>
<p>7. Sentences as truth candidates 44</p>
<p>8. Theoretical terms 44</p>
<p>9. Varieties of instrumentalism 45</p>
<p>10. Pragmatism and instrumentalism 45</p>
<p>11. Systems, simplicity, reduction 46</p>
<p>12. Crises in science 51</p>
<p>13. Reduction and expansion 52</p>
<p>Chapter 3: Worlds 55</p>
<p>1. Philosophies of truth 55</p>
<p>2. Operationism and truth 57</p>
<p>3. Version–dependence 59</p>
<p>4. Differences among scientifically oriented philosophers 61</p>
<p>5. Monism, pluralism, plurealism 62</p>
<p>6. Realism versus irrealism 66</p>
<p>7. A theory of everything 72</p>
<p>8. The status of ethics 75</p>
<p>9. Emotive theories; Ayer and Stevenson 75</p>
<p>10. Moore s ethical intuitionism 77</p>
<p>11. Dewey and ethical naturalism 79</p>
<p>12. Symbol, reference, and ritual 81</p>
<p>Part II: Related Pragmatic Themes 93</p>
<p>Chapter 4: Belief and Method 95</p>
<p>Introduction 95</p>
<p>1. Problems of pragmatism and pragmatic responses 98</p>
<p>2. Peirce s theory of belief, doubt, and inquiry 102</p>
<p>3. Peirce s comparison of methods 104</p>
<p>4. Difficulties in Peirce s treatment 106</p>
<p>5. An epistemological interpretation 108</p>
<p>6. The primacy of method 109</p>
<p>Chapter 5: Action and Commitment 114</p>
<p>Chapter 6: Emotion and Cognition 125</p>
<p>1. Emotions in the service of cognition 126</p>
<p>2. Cognitive emotions 132</p>
<p>Index 143</p>