Rationality Through Reasoning
Samenvatting
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.
Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought
Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us
Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought
Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent–relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.
Offers a new answer to the motivation question of how a normative belief motivates an action.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
<p>1 Introduction 1</p>
<p>1.1 Motivation 1</p>
<p>1.2 This book 4</p>
<p>Notes 6</p>
<p>2 Ought 8</p>
<p>2.1 The meaning of ought 8</p>
<p>2.2 Normative and non–normative oughts 9</p>
<p>2.3 Owned and unowned oughts 12</p>
<p>2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25</p>
<p>Notes 29</p>
<p>3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31</p>
<p>3.1 Sidgwick s View 31</p>
<p>3.2 The need to decide 34</p>
<p>3.3 Objective and prospective oughts 36</p>
<p>3.4 Valuing prospects 41</p>
<p>3.5 Summary 45</p>
<p>Notes 45</p>
<p>4 Reasons 46</p>
<p>4.1 Introduction and preliminaries 46</p>
<p>4.2 Pro toto reasons 49</p>
<p>4.3 Pro tanto reasons 51</p>
<p>4.4 Most reason 62</p>
<p>4.5 Ownership of reasons 65</p>
<p>5 Responding to Reasons 71</p>
<p>5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons 71</p>
<p>5.2 The quick objection 74</p>
<p>5.3 Attitudinal reasons 75</p>
<p>5.4 Sufficiency of reasons 82</p>
<p>Notes 87</p>
<p>6 Responding to Reason–Beliefs 88</p>
<p>6.1 The Enkratic Condition 88</p>
<p>6.2 Meeting your own standards 91</p>
<p>6.3 Responding correctly to P–beliefs 101</p>
<p>6.4 Conclusion 107</p>
<p>Notes 108</p>
<p>7 Requirements 109</p>
<p>7.1 Two sorts of requirement 109</p>
<p>7.2 Property requirements 110</p>
<p>7.3 Source requirements 116</p>
<p>7.4 Logic for requirements? 119</p>
<p>7.5 Ought 126</p>
<p>Notes 129</p>
<p>8 Conditional Requirements 132</p>
<p>8.1 Application and content 132</p>
<p>8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134</p>
<p>Notes 146</p>
<p>Appendix to Chapter 8 148</p>
<p>9 Synchronic Rationality 149</p>
<p>9.1 Introduction and method 149</p>
<p>9.2 Consistency 154</p>
<p>9.3 Deduction 157</p>
<p>9.4 Instrumental Rationality 159</p>
<p>9.5 Enkrasia 170</p>
<p>9.6 Bayesian requirements 175</p>
<p>Notes 175</p>
<p>10 Diachronic Rationality 177</p>
<p>10.1 Persistence of Intention 177</p>
<p>10.2 The rationality of doing as you decide 181</p>
<p>10.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185</p>
<p>Notes 69</p>
<p>10.4 Basing prohibitions and basing permissions 186</p>
<p>Notes 191</p>
<p>11 Rationality and Normativity 192</p>
<p>11.1 The Normative Question 192</p>
<p>11.2 More on rationality and reasons 193</p>
<p>11.3 Is rationality derivatively normative? 197</p>
<p>11.4 Is rationality non–derivatively normative? 204</p>
<p>Notes 205</p>
<p>12 Higher–Order Reasoning 206</p>
<p>12.1 The reasoning process 206</p>
<p>12.2 Reasoning through an intention 210</p>
<p>12.3 Reasoning with judgement–sensitive attitudes 216</p>
<p>12.4 One more point 219</p>
<p>Notes 220</p>
<p>13 First–Order Reasoning 221</p>
<p>13.1 The reasoning process 221</p>
<p>13.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for reasoning 225</p>
<p>13.3 Operating on contents 231</p>
<p>13.4 Reasoning as activity 235</p>
<p>13.5 Reasoning at the first order 242</p>
<p>13.6 The direction of reasoning 243</p>
<p>13.7 Correct belief reasoning 246</p>
<p>Notes 248</p>
<p>14 Practical Reasoning 250</p>
<p>14.1 Reasoning with attitudes other than beliefs 250</p>
<p>14.2 Correctness 255</p>
<p>14.3 Choosing a means 261</p>
<p>14.4 Hypothesizing 264</p>
<p>Notes 265</p>
<p>15 Explicit Reasoning 267</p>
<p>15.1 Markers 267</p>
<p>15.2 Bayesian and expressivist reasoning 275</p>
<p>15.3 Reasoning with absences 278</p>
<p>15.4 Theoretical and practical reasoning 281</p>
<p>15.5 Intention reasoning with other markers 285</p>
<p>Notes 286</p>
<p>16 Enkratic Reasoning 288</p>
<p>16.1 Enkratic reasoning 288</p>
<p>16.2 Humean objections 291</p>
<p>16.3 Conclusion 294</p>
<p>Notes 294</p>
<p>Bibliography 295</p>
<p>Index 303</p>