Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality

Introduction. Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality; J.R. Searle. Interview with John R. Searle; R. Stoecker. Speech Acts. How Performatives Don't Work; G. Grewendorf. Are Performative Utterances Declarations? R.M. Harnish. Expressibility, Explicability, and Taxonomy. Some Remarks on the Principle of Expressibility; F. Kannetzky. Expressing an Intentional State; A. Kemmerling. On the Proper Treatment of Performatives; A. Martinich. Why Do We Mean Something Rather Than Nothing? C. Plunze. What Is an Illocutionary Point? M. Siebel. Searle on Meaning and Action; D. Vanderveken. Mind. Understanding Utterances and Other Actions; T. Bartelborth, O. Scholz. Intrinsic Intentionality; W. Lenzen. Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology. Notes on Searle's Views about Consciousness; M. Nida-Rümelin. The Hidden Algebra of the Mind from a Linguistic Perspective; T. Roeper. Identification and Misidentification; A. Stroll. Social Reality. Searle on Social Reality: Process Is Prior to Product; S.B. Barnes. On Searle's Collective Intentionality. Some Notes; G. Meggle. Searle's Theory of Institutional Facts: A Program of Critical Revision; J. Moural. True Reality and Real Truth; D. Sosa. Searle, Collective Intentionality, and Social Institutions; R. Tuomela. New Perspectives. The Classical Model of Rationality and Its Weaknesses; J.R. Searle. Contributors.