Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

List of illustrations<BR>Abbreviations<BR>Preface<BR>PART I: INTRODUCTION<BR>1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior; Carl Dahlström and Lena Wängnerud <BR>2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash; Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein<BR>3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?; Susan Rose-Ackerman<BR>4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption; Ann Towns<BR>PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING<BR>5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior; Anna Persson and Martin Sjöstedt<BR>6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood; Ulrika Möller and Isabell Schierenbeck<BR>7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa; Michelle D'Arcy<BR>8. Stability and Stagnation; Anders Sundell<BR>PART III: POWER-SHARING <BR>9. Democratic and Professional Accountability; Carl Dahlström and Victor Lapuente<BR>10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership; Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev<BR>11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior; Petrus Olander<BR>12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior; Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes<BR>PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES<BR>13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government; Philip Keefer<BR>14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties; Helena Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud and Mattias Agerberg<BR>15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government; Andreas Bågenholm and Nicholas Charron<BR>16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship; Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg<BR>Index