Philosophical Issues, Volume 23 – Epistemic Agency

<p>1. Knowledge and Action</p>
<p>Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human&nbsp; Agency<br /> ERNEST SOSA&nbsp; 1</p>
<p>Skeptical Challenges and Knowing&nbsp;Action&nbsp;<br /> STEPHEN HETHERINGTON&nbsp; 18</p>
<p>Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and&nbsp; Epistemic Agency<br /> BARON REED&nbsp; 40</p>
<p>2. Agency and Responsibility</p>
<p>Rational Ought Implies Can &nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> RALPH WEDGWOOD&nbsp; 70</p>
<p>Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices<br /> LUCY O BRIEN&nbsp; 93</p>
<p>The Possibility of Epistemic&nbsp;Responsibility<br /> MIGUEL&acute;ANGEL FERNANDEZ&nbsp;109</p>
<p>Epistemic Responsibility and&nbsp;Doxastic Agency<br /> CONOR MCHUGH&nbsp; 132</p>
<p>Is Epistemic Agency Possible?&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> PASCAL ENGEL&nbsp; 158</p>
<p>Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> KIERAN SETIYA&nbsp; 179</p>
<p>Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB s Appeal?<br /> E. J. COFFMAN&nbsp; 199</p>
<p>3. Intellectual Virtues</p>
<p>In Defense of Reflection<br /> VALERIE TIBERIUS&nbsp; 223</p>
<p>Intellectual Autonomy<br /> LINDA ZAGZEBSKI&nbsp; 244</p>
<p>A Neo–Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency<br /> SARAH WRIGHT&nbsp; 262</p>
<p>Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves&nbsp;for Epistemic Improvement<br /> KRISTOFFER AHLSTROM–VIJ&nbsp; 276</p>
<p>4. Reasoning and Epistemic Norms</p>
<p>Scope for Rational Autonomy<br /> MARK SCHROEDER&nbsp; 297</p>
<p>Why We Reason the Way We Do<br /> NISHI SHAH&nbsp; 311</p>
<p>Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic Norms<br /> JESSICA BROWN&nbsp; 326</p>
<p>Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons<br /> MICHAEL P. LYNCH&nbsp; 343</p>
<p>The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism<br /> SELIM BERKER&nbsp; 363</p>
<p>What Is an Inference?&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> RAM NETA&nbsp; 388</p>
<p>Errata &nbsp;408</p>