C MacDonald
John Wiley & Sons
e druk, 2005
9780631186953
Varieties of Things – Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics
Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics
Specificaties
Paperback, 288 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
e druk, 2005
ISBN13: 9780631186953
Rubricering
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen
Samenvatting
Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience.
A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience.
Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics.
Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals.
Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti–reductionism.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
<p>Preface vii</p>
<p>Part I: Metaphysics and Its Tools</p>
<p>1 The Nature and Function of Metaphysics 3</p>
<p>The Methodology and Subject Matter of Metaphysics 4</p>
<p>Aristotle s Conception of Metaphysics 8</p>
<p>Kant s Conception of Metaphysics 11</p>
<p>A Working Conception of Metaphysics 14</p>
<p>2 Some Tools of Metaphysics 36</p>
<p>Criteria of Ontological Commitment: Two Examples 36</p>
<p> No Entity without Identity : Identity Conditions for Objects 56</p>
<p>Individuation Conditions, Identity Conditions, and Metaphysical Kinds 59</p>
<p>Principles and Criteria of Identity 63</p>
<p>Part II: Particulars</p>
<p>3 Material Substances 79</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Material Substances 79</p>
<p>The Bundle Theory and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 81</p>
<p>Problems with the Bundle Theory 84</p>
<p>The Bare Substratum Theory and the Principle of Acquaintance 110</p>
<p>Objections to the Bare Substratum Theory 113</p>
<p>An Alternative 114</p>
<p>4 Persons and Personal Identity 135</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Persons 135</p>
<p>Candidates for Persistence Conditions for Persons 138</p>
<p>The Closest Continuer Theory and Its Problems 150</p>
<p>Does the Concept of Identity Apply to Persons? 155</p>
<p>The Multiple Occupancy Thesis 162</p>
<p>Back to Basics: Continuity and Fission 164</p>
<p>A Suggestion 169</p>
<p>5 Events 181</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Events 183</p>
<p>Three Criteria: Spatio–temporal Coincidence, Necessary Spatio–temporal Coincidence, and Sameness of Cause and Effect 186</p>
<p>The Property Exemplification Account of Events (PEE) 193</p>
<p>Part III: Universals</p>
<p>6 Universals and the Realism/Nominalism Dispute 219</p>
<p>The Issue 223</p>
<p>Varieties of Nominalism 225</p>
<p>Two Conceptions of Universals 236</p>
<p>The Regress Charge and Two Unsuccessful Attempts to Meet It 239</p>
<p>An Alternative 245</p>
<p>Bibliography 260</p>
<p>Index 272</p>
<p>Part I: Metaphysics and Its Tools</p>
<p>1 The Nature and Function of Metaphysics 3</p>
<p>The Methodology and Subject Matter of Metaphysics 4</p>
<p>Aristotle s Conception of Metaphysics 8</p>
<p>Kant s Conception of Metaphysics 11</p>
<p>A Working Conception of Metaphysics 14</p>
<p>2 Some Tools of Metaphysics 36</p>
<p>Criteria of Ontological Commitment: Two Examples 36</p>
<p> No Entity without Identity : Identity Conditions for Objects 56</p>
<p>Individuation Conditions, Identity Conditions, and Metaphysical Kinds 59</p>
<p>Principles and Criteria of Identity 63</p>
<p>Part II: Particulars</p>
<p>3 Material Substances 79</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Material Substances 79</p>
<p>The Bundle Theory and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 81</p>
<p>Problems with the Bundle Theory 84</p>
<p>The Bare Substratum Theory and the Principle of Acquaintance 110</p>
<p>Objections to the Bare Substratum Theory 113</p>
<p>An Alternative 114</p>
<p>4 Persons and Personal Identity 135</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Persons 135</p>
<p>Candidates for Persistence Conditions for Persons 138</p>
<p>The Closest Continuer Theory and Its Problems 150</p>
<p>Does the Concept of Identity Apply to Persons? 155</p>
<p>The Multiple Occupancy Thesis 162</p>
<p>Back to Basics: Continuity and Fission 164</p>
<p>A Suggestion 169</p>
<p>5 Events 181</p>
<p>Our Ontological Commitment to Events 183</p>
<p>Three Criteria: Spatio–temporal Coincidence, Necessary Spatio–temporal Coincidence, and Sameness of Cause and Effect 186</p>
<p>The Property Exemplification Account of Events (PEE) 193</p>
<p>Part III: Universals</p>
<p>6 Universals and the Realism/Nominalism Dispute 219</p>
<p>The Issue 223</p>
<p>Varieties of Nominalism 225</p>
<p>Two Conceptions of Universals 236</p>
<p>The Regress Charge and Two Unsuccessful Attempts to Meet It 239</p>
<p>An Alternative 245</p>
<p>Bibliography 260</p>
<p>Index 272</p>
