one Modern Notions of Probability.- I: Some Modern Views on Probability.- Historical Origin of Probability.- The Foundations of Probability.- Mathematicians and Probability.- “Objective” Theories of Probability.- Probability as an Extra-Mathematical Interpretation.- “Non-Objective” Aspects of Probability.- Probability Modern and Medieval.- Two A Medieval Notion of Probability.- II: Opinion, Error, and Human Imperfection.- A. The Limitations of Human Knowledge.- I. The Fact of Human Ignorance.- 2. Human Error and Its Causes.- (a) The Phantasm as the Source of Error.- (b) Opinion as the Locus of Error.- B. Opinionative Knowledge.- I. The Notion of Opinion.- 2. False Opinion as the Evil of the Intellect.- (a) Opinionative Knowledge Not a Virtue.- (b) The Opinionative “Part” of the Soul.- 3. Transcendence over Opinion: The Way to Happiness.- (a) Happiness as Knowledge of Truth.- (b) Truth Perfected in God.- C. Ideal Models of Perfect Knowledge.- I. God’s Knowledge.- 2. Angelic Knowledge.- 3. Adam’s Knowledge.- 4. Superior Human Knowledge.- (a) Prophetic Knowledge.- (b) Christ’s Knowledge.- (c) Charismatic Knowledge.- D.The Dialectical Road to Truth.- III: Tradition as a Source of Opinion and Probability.- A. The Two Traditions: “Philosophy” and “The Faith”.- B. The Relative Authority of the Two Traditions.- I. Reason and the Opinions of the Philosophers.- (a) Philosophers and The Philosopher.- (b)The Saints and Secular Learning.- 2. Revelation and the Opinions of the Saints.- C. The Intellectual Evil of Unbehef.- 1. The Nature and Scope of Heresy.- 2. The Psychology of Heresy.- 3. Moses Maimonides and the Jews.- D.Inadequacy of Authority as a Criterion of Probability.- 1. Flaws in the Distinction between Traditions.- 2. Flaws in the Superiority of the Saintly Tradition.- (a) Superiority as a Justification of Evil.- (b) Error in the Superior Tradition.- (C) Superior Knowledge in the Inferior Tradition.- IV: Probability in Disputation and Demonstration.- A. Opinion, Probability and Disputation.- I. Contradiction, Truth and Disputation.- 2. Theoretical Foundations of Disputation.- (a) Argument as Distinguished from Demonstration.- (b) Linguistic Presuppositions of Disputation.- (c) The Metascientific Role of Disputation.- (i) The Extraneous Opinion.- (ii) Logica Utens as a Metalanguage.- (iii) Probability as a Golden Mean.- (d) Faith, Probability and Disputation.- 3. The Human Element in Disputation.- B. Opinion, Probability and Demonstration.- I. Thomas’s Theory of Science.- (a) The Scientific Proposition.- (b) The Principles of Science.- 2. Science and Probability.- (a) Demonstrative and Probable Argumentation.- (b) Opinion as Non-Demonstrated Knowledge.- (c) Faith, Probability and Demonstration.- V: The Quasi-Mathematics of Truth: Semper and Some of the Time.- A. The Logical Structure of the Contingent.- I. Contingency and Necessity.- 2. Possibility and Impossibility.- (a) Physical versus Logical Possibility.- (b) Logical or “Theological” Possibility.- B.The Quasi-Statistics of Morality.- 1. Thomas’s Theory of Applied Mathematics.- 2. Frequency as Determinant of Contingency.- (a) “Ut in Pluribus” and “Ut in Paucioribus”.- (b) Monsters in a Divinely Ordered Universe.- (c). Relative Frequency of Good and Evil.- C. Moral Deliberation and Probability.- I. Laws as Practical Principles.- 2. Moral Deliberation.- (a) Deliberation as Dialectical.- (b) The Dialectic of Deliberation.- 3. Knowledge and Virtue.- D. Man’s Knowledge of the Future Contingent.- VI: Thomas’s Theocentric Perspective on Probability.- A. Meta-Physical Aspects of Truth as Eternal.- B. Metalogical Aspects of Truth as Demonstrated.- C. Metahistorical Aspects of Truth as Authoritative.- D. Metapsychological Aspects of Truth as Certain.- E. God as the Culmination of Rational Dialectic.- Conclusion: On the Historical Dimension of “Probability”.- I. There is a similarity between the structure of Thomas’s thought patterns and contemporary thought patterns.- II. There is a similarity between Thomas’s notion of opinion, or probable knowledge, and modern notions of non-demonstrative knowledge.- III. There is a similarity between Thomas’s disputation and the modern calculus of probability.- IV. There is a similarity (A) between Thomas’s theory of probability and the modern logical theory of probability and (B) between Thomas’s theory of contingency and the modern frequency theory of probability.- V. There is a relationship between Thomas’s distinction between scientia and opinion-probability and the modern problem of probability in science.- Selected Bibliography.
