John Grote

I. Introduction.- 1. John Grote’s Life.- i. Sketch of his lif.- ii. His brother.- iii. Relationship with Elli.- 2. Writings.- i. Writings enumerate.- ii. Remarks on writing.- iii. Additional information relating to circumstances under which writings were presente.- 3. Statement, and Division, of the Problem.- 4. Survey of Sources and of Previous Work on the Problem.- i. Source.- a. Plat.- b. Kant and other modern philosopher.- ii. Previous work on the proble.- 5. Transition to Next Chapter.- II. Grote’s View of Phenomenalism.- I. Distinction of Terms: ‘Noumenon,’ ‘Phenomenon,’ and ‘Thing in Itself’.- i. Derivation and meaning of ‘noumenon,’ and ‘phenomenon’.- a. ‘Noumenon’.- b. ‘Phenomenon’.- ii. ‘Noumenon,’ ‘phenomenon,’ and ‘thing in itself,’ as used by Kant.- iii. Reinhold on ‘noumenon,’ and ‘thing in itself’.- 2. What Phenomenalism Means.- i. Three ways in which phenomenalism has been regarded.- ii. Grote’s meaning.- iii. Berkeley’s meaning.- a. General.- b. Physiologist denies any distinction between ‘philosophy’ and phenomena.- iv. Grote is specially concerned with ‘phenomenon’ and ‘thing in itself‘.- 3. Phenomenal Reality.- i. How it is’ seen’.- ii. How it is related to life.- 4. Two Tests of Phenomenalism.- 5. The Phenomenalist Spirit or Mind.- 6. Summary and Foreword to Next Chapter.- III. Grote’s Interpretation of the Relation of Phenomenalism to Philosophy.- 1. Each is Necessary to the Other.- 2. Consciousness as Active and Passive.- i. The phenomenalist view presupposes consciousness passive.- a. Consciousness of a process taking place between the matter of nature and the matter of our bodies.- b. Kant recognizes phenomenal reality as a necessary supplement to reason.- ii. Consciousness is also active.- a. Emphasis on ‘philosophy’ may lead to epistemo-logical idealism.- b. Sensation, intelligence, and will.- (1) These three terms have a close relationship to each other.- (2) Sensation and experience.- (3) Contemplation is essentially non-phenomenal; communication is phenomenal.- (4) Contemplation is both active and passive.- (5) Commencement of willing requires particulars.- (6) Recapitulation on the knowing process.- 3. Analysis of Sensation.- i. Sensing in general.- a.’ sensation proper’ and ‘the sensation of our activity’.- b. Philosophy and logic.- ii. Two meanings of sensation.- 4. Time and Space.- i. Time, but not space, is necessary for acting and willing.- ii. Space adequately reveals to us our active nature.- iii. Sensation as a feeling, and sensation of our activity.- iv. Sensations of pleasure and of pain.- v. Time is common to both consciousness and phenomena.- vi. Space is only partially common to both consciousness and phenomena.- vii. Conception of space by analogy.- viii. Résumé.- ix. Rationality ascribed to spatial objects.- 5. The Relationship of Phenomenalism to Philosophy Further Illustrated.- i. By taste.- ii. By sight.- a. The eye is virtually a machine.- b. Color is subjectively felt.- iii. Sensation of space is the same no matter what senses are used.- iv. Concerning the defining of ‘phenomenon’; Professor Brightman’s definition and Grote’s analysis.- v. Significance of sight among the senses.- vi. Mind’ sees’.- vii. Quantity of phenomenal communication.- 6. Relationship Through Contrast.- i. Phenomenalist view reached through an unphenome-nal process.- ii. Phenomena as a deposit from our thinking.- iii. Extra-phenomenal elements in sensation make phenomena perceptual.- 7. Mind Provides Unity.- i. The extra-phenomenal gives unity.- ii. Phenomenal reality essentially obscured.- iii. Awareness is not the process of operation of phenomena.- 8. Grote Avoids A Basic Blunder in Behaviorism.- 9. Kant’s Abstraction of Phenomenal Reality from Reason.- i. Kant stresses reason.- ii. Concerning the disengaging of “the action of intelligence from all application and actual use of it”.- iii. Basic agreement between Kant and Grote.- 10. Abstracting of Consciousness from Phenomena is Unwarranted.- i. Descartes.- ii. Spinoza.- 11. Historical Recapitulation.- 12. Main Contribution of the Chapter, with Comment.- 13. Transition to Next Chapter.- IV. Philosophy As Consciousness and the Ego.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Ferrier’s Treatment of Philosophy and Phenomenalism.- i. The philosophical and the phenomenalist views clearly-distinguished by Ferrier.- ii. Subject-object relation.- iii. The ego and the non-ego.- 3. Criticism of Grote and Ferrier on the Basis of Lotze’s Position.- i. The Non-Ego is not essential to the Ego.- ii. Three interpretations of the objection, to the personality of God, considered.- iii. Human mind projected into nature.- a. Not necessary for mind to project itself into nature.- b. No projection of mind in the complete view.- 4. Meaning of ‘Know,’ and ‘Know About,’ in Reference to Phenomenal Reality.- i. The knowing of phenomenal reality viewed in two ways.- ii. ‘Know’ and ‘know about’ in relation to phenomena and things in themselves.- 5. Relativity of Knowledge.- i. Knowledge is essentially relative.- ii. Misleading to speak of ‘modes of existence’.- iii. Misleading view presented by Ferrier in writing about the ‘Primary Law of Condition of all Knowledge’.- iv. ‘Ordinary’ and ‘natural’ thinking.- 6. Summary of Main Issues.- V. ‘Philosophy’ and the Scale of Sensation.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Importance of the Scale of Sensation.- i. Meaning of sensation very significant.- ii. ‘The scale of sensation’.- iii. The center of the scale.- iv. Importance of the scale of sensation for Hamilton’s position.- v. Locke’s error resembles Hamilton’s.- 3. Two Kinds of Knowledge — ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’.- i. Meaning of the terms.- a. ‘Higher philosophy’.- b. ‘Lower philosophy’.- ii. Reid’s answer to skeptics is impotent.- iii. Hamilton regards the ‘philosophy’ of knowledge as the analysis of consciousness.- a. Grote points out the defect in Hamilton’s use of the term ‘consciousness’.- b. Grote states a reason for Hamilton’s ‘consciousness’ of the external world.- c. Hamilton’s writing on consciousness vitiated.- d. ‘Natural Dualism’ and ‘Hypothetical Dualists’.- e. Matter is only one entity of which we are conscious.- f. Hamilton states that he knows matter, even before he examines consciousness of it.- g. We are immediately cognizant of the non-ego.- 4. Hamilton, Mill and Reid Compared.- i. Hamilton and Mill — starting-point of each in regard to philosophy and phenomena.- ii. Hamilton and Reid.- iii. Source of Hamilton’s error.- iv. Source of Mill’s error.- 5. Descartes and Hamilton.- i. Descartes’s epistemological approach, and Hamilton’s.- ii. Hamilton’s imperfect application of consciousness.- 6. Proper Use of Certain Terms in Relation to the Scale of Sensation.- i. ‘Presence’ and ‘presentation’.- ii. ‘Presentation’ and ‘representation’.- iii. ‘Mediate’ and ‘immediate’.- 7. Critical Reflection on the Foregoing Chapter.- VI. Phenomenalist Logic and Knowledge.- 1. Introductory.- i. Brief résumé.- ii. Relation of the’ scale of sensation’ to phenomenalist logic.- 2. Grote’s Own Position Revealed Through Criticism of Hamilton and Mill.- i. Mill and Hamilton — their consistency compared.- ii. Basis of Hamilton’s error.- iii. Mill is justified in writing on phenomenalist logic.- iv. Formal and Real Logic contrasted.- v. Mill’s phenomenalism and Hamilton’s ‘philosophy’.- vi. Spencer’s reflections support Grote.- vii. Mill is faithful to phenomenalist logic.- a. General comment.- b. ‘Names’ and ‘notions’.- c. Syllogistic logic.- 3. Phenomenalism Inadequate For A Perfect Scheme of Knowledge.- i. Reasoning not an element in phenomenal reality.- ii. Time and space, and phenomenal reality.- iii. Belief and phenomena.- iv. Mis-psychology.- 4. Critical Observations and Analyses.- i. Why Grote deals with Hamilton and Mill at all.- ii. Things in themselves and phenomena.- iii. Further reflections on ‘phenomenon’.- iv. Personalism.- v. Transition.- VII. The Introspective Method in Knowledge.- 1. Introduction.- i. Introspection concerned both with ‘knowing’ and the ‘known’.- ii. Ideas not innate but of empirical origin.- iii. Reflection has both active and passive elements.- iv. Two questions faced in this chapter.- 2. Locke’s Psychology.- i. Error in the introspective method.- ii. Mis-psychology.- iii. The mind as a tabula rasa.- iv. All experience requires ideas.- v. Ideas give the ‘external world’ meaning.- vi. Phenomenal reality cannot produce thought.- vii. Primary and secondary qualities.- viii. Interrelations among ideas.- ix. Locke emphasizes the ‘philosophical’ and the phenomenal approaches to epistemology, interchangeably.- x. Grote’s suggested improvement for Locke’s introspective method.- a. Locke should have recognized the ‘purely mental experience’ in our mental history.- b. Appraisal of Grote’s suggestion.- 3. Hume’s Rationalism.- i. ‘Mis-psychology’.- ii. Strong tendency toward rationalism.- iii. ‘The creative power of the mind’.- iv. Place of mind in ‘impression’.- v. Relations.- vi. Are cause and effect relations concerned with ideas or with matters of fact?.- vii. Idea, impression, and ‘impressioning’.- 4. Berkeley’s Subjectivism.- i. Berkeley’s approach wholly ‘philosophical’.- ii. Importance of judgment.- iii. Vision at the eye.- iv. Phenomenalism evident in Berkeley.- v. Fundamental agreement between Grote and Berkeley.- vi. Berkeley’s illustration valuable to Grote’s interpretation.- 5. Spencer’s and Morell’s Evolutionism.- i. Spencer repeats the error of the Lockian psychology.- ii. Identity of consciousness of facts with the facts themselves.- iii. Perfect success of the attempt to harmonize thought with things reveals truth.- iv. Spencer compared with Spinoza.- v. Not necessary to trace the growth of knowledge to reveal truth.- vi. Spencer compared with Locke.- vii. Explanation by considering the genesis of thought is inadequate.- viii. ‘The experience-hypothesis’.- ix. Criticism of the use of the term ‘experience’.- x. Much evidence of ‘bad psychology’ in Spencer.- xi. Explanation of the origin of ‘consciousness’ is unsatisfactory.- xii. Morell’s ‘bad psychology’.- a. Morell resembles Spencer in repeating the error of the Lockian psychology.- b. Concerning the origin of consciousness.- c. Morell compared with Spencer.- 6. Retrospect and Prospect.- i. Retrospect.- a. Purpose.- b. Locke.- c. Hume.- d. Berkeley.- e. Spencer (and Morell).- ii. Prospect.- VIII. Immediateness and Reflection.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Purpose of the Chapter in Introducing These Terms.- 3. Meaning of Immediateness and Reflection.- i. No reality without mind.- ii. ‘Immediate’ and ‘mediate’ thought.- iii. The’ self-self and the ‘thought-self.- iv. Where reflective thought departs from immediate-ness.- v. Reflectional intelligence.- vi. Immediate knowledge possesses a minimum of reflection.- vii. Immediate thought develops into knowledge.- viii. ‘Pre-distinctional’ immediateness.- ix. Intuition.- a. Meaning of ‘intuition’.- b. Trueness of ‘intuition’.- x. Antithesis between immediateness and reflection.- xi. Criticism of Kant’s ‘experience’.- xii. English philosophy unjustified in making antithesis between ‘ideas’ and ‘experience’.- xiii. Immediateness, and’ subject’ and ‘object’.- xiv. Self-consciousness not dependent upon the ‘objective’.- xv. Sensibility and activity.- a. Want.- b. ‘Reflectiveness’.- c. Reflection as action.- d. Semi-consciousness.- xvi. Immediateness and reflection illustrated by carpet.- xvii. A paradox.- xviii. ‘Knowledge of acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge of judgment’.- a. Intuition as ‘looking on’.- b. Basis for distinction arises in immediateness and reflection.- c. Analogy in Ferrier.- 4. Significance of Immediateness and Reflection in Grote’s Philosophy.- 5. Critical Comment.- 6. Relation to the Following Chapter.- IX. Personalism in Grote’s Writings.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Epistemological Monism.- 3. Monistic, Pluralistic, and Theistic Personalism.- i. Grote’s unique personalism.- ii. Monism and pluralism.- a. Introductory.- b. Monism.- c. Pluralism.- iii. Theism.- a. Grote, a Berkeleian ?.- b. Resemblances to Berkeley.- c. Grote is essentially theistic.- 4. Critique of Materialism.- i. The natural sciences.- a. Psychical anatomists.- b. Professed materialists.- c. New Realists.- c. Imagination and memory.- ii. ‘Proverse’ and ‘retroverse’.- a. Significance of these terms.- b. Bain’s psychology.- 5. Critical Comment.- i. Intuition.- ii. The’ self-self’.- iii. Attitude toward materialism.- iv. Analysis of sensation into two elements.- 6. Summary and Transition to Next Chapter.- X. Grote’s Idealism.- 1. Introduction.- i. Ideal-ism.- ii. Personal idealism evident in ethics and epistemology.- iii. Distinctions in idealisms.- 2. Grote’s Platonism.- i. Ideals.- ii. Examination of a dialogue.- iii. Grote’s idealism evident.- iv. Anti-relativjstic, generally.- v. Of utmost importance to teach ideals.- vi. Ideal and approbative ethics.- 3. Critique of Utilitarianism.- i. Relation of this critique to views on Plato.- ii. Problems not settled in utilitarianism.- iii. Descriptive and normative ethics.- iv. Why adopt ‘the greatest happiness’ standard.- v. Activity and virtue.- vi. Eudaemonia.- a. Relation to ‘aretaics’.- b. Reason for including ‘aretaics’.- vii. Bentham’s influence in popularizing hedonism.- viii. Difficulties which Mill’s utilitarianism does not avoid.- a. Whose happiness not answered.- b. Mill’s utilitarianism uses extraneous elements.- c. Mill’s positivism helpless by itself.- ix. Non-idealist origin of Bentham’s utilitarianism.- x. Grote’s idealism akin to idealism in Christianity.- xi. Idealism haunts Mill’s utilitarianism.- xii. Quantity and quality amongst pleasures.- xiii. Utilitarianism suffers from lack of sufficient and consistent idealism.- 4. A Critique of Moral Ideals.- i. Idealism basic in Grote’s two works in the field of ethics.- ii. ‘Aretaics’ and ‘eudaemonics’ kept separate.- iii. Criticism of Grote’s sharp distinction between ‘aretaics’ and ‘eudaemonics’.- iv. Want or ‘egence’.- 5. Critical Remarks.- i. Bases of Grote’s idealism enumerated.- ii. General criticism covering the foregoing bases.- 6. Concluding Note to this Chapter.- Conclusion.- 1. Grote’s Position in the History of Philosophy.- i. Scanty position given to Grote in modern philosophy.- ii. John Grote overshadowed by his brother, George.- iii. Bain’s slight reference to Grote.- iv. Stephen’s reference to Grote.- v. Remarks in an obituary notice.- vi. ‘Knowledge of acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge about’.- a. James’s debt to Grote.- b. Eaton’s debt to Grote.- c. Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson.- d. Robinson refers to ‘William James’s famous distinction’.- e. Joseph acknowledges Grote’s distinction.- f. Whitehead’s relation to Grote.- g. Ward’s adequate reference to Grote.- h. Sellars’ reference to Grote.- i. Mackenzie gives proper credit to Grote.- j. Brightman’s informative reference to and acknowledgment of Grote.- vii. Two recent and peculiarly significant references to Grote’s philosophy.- 2. Further Critical Comment.- Appendix: An Exposition of the Miscellaneous Writings of John Grote.- I. “On A Furture State”.- 1. Glorification of body and mind.- 2. Simplicity of style and thought in this article.- 3. Effect of present life on the future.- 4. Manner of individual appearance in a future life is unimportant.- 5. Stress on the importance of both present and future life.- 6. Comment.- II. “On Glossology”.- 1. Concerning terminology.- i. Break in Grote’s projected work on glossology.- ii.’ Phone’ and ‘noem’.- iii.’ Phonism’ and ‘noematism’.- iv. Ideas of physical ‘things’.- v. Stomatism.- vi. ‘Hypophonism’.- 2. The philosophy of language.- i. Four divisions.- ii. ‘Noematism’.- iii. ‘Noematoschematism’.- iv.’ Phonarium’.- v. ‘Dianoematism’.- vi. In extreme cases the modification in noematism is very great.- 3. Criticism of Tooke.- 4. Criticism of Trench.- 5. Comment.- III. “Thought vs. Learning”.- 1. A contrast.- 2. Use of one’s own mind is of chief importance.- 3. Thought and learning stagnation.- 4. Comment.- IV. “Pascal and Montaigne”.- 1. A brief comparison.- 2. Pascal’s devotion to religion.- 3. Montaigne’s neopaganism.- 4. Pascal on happiness.- 5. Comment.- V. “On the Dating of Ancient History”.- 1. Dating of events by two methods — epochal and eponymous.- 2. Dynastical reckoning.- 3. Olympiadic dating.- 4. Dating by lunar months.- 5. Dating originating in Christendom.- 6. Other methods of dating.- 7. Present and future methods of dating.- VI. “Origin and Meaning of Roman Names”.- 1. Significance of ‘nomen,’ ‘praenomen,’ and ‘cognomen’.- 2. Criticism of Plutarch.- 3. Change in a Roman name.- 4. Criticism of Varro’s view.- 5. Present-day names based on Roman rather than on Greek.- VII. Conclusion to Miscellaneous Writings.- Chronological Bibliography of the Writings of John Grote.- General Bibliography.