Social Choice and Democracy

1: Introduction.- 1.1. Rational Choice.- 1.2. The Theory of Social Choice.- 1.3. Restrictions on the Set of Alternatives.- 1.4. Structural Stability of the Core.- 2: Social Choice.- 2.1. Preference Relations.- 2.2. Social Preference Functions.- 2.3. Arrowian Impossibility Theorems.- 2.4. Power and Rationality.- 2.5. Choice and Functions.- 3: Voting Rules.- 3.1. Simple Binary Preference Functions.- 3.2. Acyclic Voting Rules on Restricted Sets of Alternatives.- 3.3. Manipulation of Choice Functions on Finite Sets of Alternatives.- 3.4. Restrictions on the Preferences of Society.- 4: The Core.- 4.1. Existence of a Choice.- 4.2. Existence of a Core in Low Dimensions.- 4.3. Convex Preferences.- 4.4. Non-Convex Preference.- 4.5. The Necessity of the Dimension Constraint.- 5: Local Cycles.- 5.1. Voting Cycles in Dimension v(?)—1.- 5.2. Implementation of Choice Functions in Dimension v(?) — 1.- 5.3. Cycles and the Stability Dimension.- 5.4. The Stability Dimension v*( ?).- 6: Structural Stability.- 6.1. Plott Symmetry Conditions.- 6.2. Structural Stability of the Optima Set.- 6.3. Structural Instability of the Optima Set.- 6.4. Stability of the Core and of Cycles.- 7: Classification of Voting Rules.- 7.1. The Stability and Instability Dimensions.- 7.2. Voting Rules in Low Dimensions.- 7.3. Majority Rule with an Infinite Electorate.- 8: Democratic Theory.- 8.1. Liberalism and Populism.- 8.2. Populist Democracy and Institutionalism.- 8.3. Liberal Theory and Electoral Politics.- 8.4. Preferences and Beliefs.- Glossary of Concepts.- Index of Authors.- Index of Terms and Definitions.