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Markets, Games, and Organizations

Essays in Honor of Roy Radner

Specificaties
Paperback, 314 blz. | Engels
Springer Berlin Heidelberg | 0e druk, 2012
ISBN13: 9783642534652
Rubricering
Springer Berlin Heidelberg 0e druk, 2012 9783642534652
Onderdeel van serie Studies in Economic Design
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen

Samenvatting

We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke­ ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co­ authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions. 

Specificaties

ISBN13:9783642534652
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:paperback
Aantal pagina's:314
Uitgever:Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Druk:0
Hoofdrubriek:Economie

Inhoudsopgave

On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy.- Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable.- Entry, productivity, and investment.- A model of Russia’s “virtual economy”.- Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments.- Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives.- Investment and concern for relative position.- Coordination of economic activity: An example.- Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching.- Roy Radner and incentive theory.- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation.- Majority rule with dollar voting.- Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution.- Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment.- Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?.- Trust and social efficiencies.- Survival and the art of profit maximization. 

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        Markets, Games, and Organizations