Vassilis Livanios
Springer International Publishing
e druk, 2016
9783319412900
Science in Metaphysics
Exploring the Metaphysics of Properties and Laws
Specificaties
Gebonden, blz.
|
Engels
Springer International Publishing |
e druk, 2016
ISBN13: 9783319412900
Rubricering
Onderdeel van serie
New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen
Samenvatting
This book explores the dispositional and categorical debates on the metaphysics of properties. It defends the view that all fundamental properties and relations are contingently categorical, while also examining alternative accounts of the nature of properties. Drawing upon both established research and the author’s own investigation into the broader discipline of the metaphysics of science, this book provides a comprehensive study of the many views and opinions regarding a most debatable topic in contemporary metaphysics. Science in Metaphysics will be of interest to metaphysicians of science, analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of science and physics alike.
Specificaties
ISBN13:9783319412900
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:gebonden
Uitgever:Springer International Publishing
Inhoudsopgave
<p>Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5</p>
<p>Against Dispositional Monism.............................................................................................. 11</p>
<p>1.1 Preliminaries: Two Distinct Issues ....................................................................................11</p>
<p>1.2 The Truthmaking Criterion for the Dispositional/Categorical Distinction ...................12</p>
<p>1.3 Arguing Against Dispositional Monism From the Actual Existence of Fundamental</p>
<p>Categorical Features ........................................................................................................................17</p>
1.3.1 Spatiotemporal Relations as fundamental categorical features .............................18</p>
<p>1.3.1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................18</p>
<p>1.3.1.2 Spatiotemporal Relations and Subjunctive Conditionals in pre-GR theories ..21</p>
<p>1.3.1.3 Bird’s Argument for the Dispositional Essence of Spatiotemporal Relations ..22</p>
<p>1.3.1.4 An Appraisal of the Argument .............................................................................24</p>
<p>1.3.1.5 A Nomic interpretation of Bird’s counterfactual?..............................................31</p>
<p>Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.................................................................... 35</p>
2.1 Identity Theory....................................................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1 Problems for Identity Theory....................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1.1 The objection from the independent variability of dispositionality with respect</p>
<p>to categoricality and vice versa. ..............................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1.2 The one categoricality-multiple dispositionalities problem................................37</p>
<p>2.1.1.3 How can we understand (and justify) the ‘surprising’ triple identity?.............38</p>
<p>2.1.2 A Unique Categoricality? ..........................................................................................43</p>
2.2 Neutral Monism ..................................................................................................................45</p>
<p>2.2.1 Neutral Monism and the Modified Ungrounded Argument...................................45</p>
<p>2.2.2 Agnosticism.................................................................................................................51</p>
<p>In Defence of Categorical Monism....................................................................................... 53</p>
<p>3.1 In defence of the categoricality of fundamental properties: the argument from</p>
<p>renormalisation ................................................................................................................................53</p>
3.2 Objections ............................................................................................................................58</p>
<p>Categorical Monism and Quidditism................................................................................... 63</p>
<p>4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................63</p>
<p>4.2 Versions of RNDV...............................................................................................................65</p>
<p>2</p>
<p>4.3 Defending RNDV ................................................................................................................72</p>
<p>4.3.1 The Permutation Difficulty........................................................................................72</p>
4.3.2 Step 1: Rejecting the Transworld Existence of Fundamental Natural Properties74</p>
<p>4.3.3 Step 2: Adopting the Counterpart Framework .......................................................77</p>
<p>4.3.4 Two Versions of Property-Counterpart Theory Consistent with RNDV..............82</p>
<p>4.3.4.1 PCT1 (First Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory) ...82</p>
<p>4.3.4.2 PCT2 (Second Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory). 84</p>
<p>4.4 RNDV as the unique way of the de re modal representation of fundamental properties ………………………………………………………………………………………………88</p>
<p>Further Objections to Categorical Monism........................................................................ 90</p>
5.1 The Argument from the truthmakers of unmanifested dispositions. .............................90</p>
<p>5.2 The Argument from science: scientific practice. ..............................................................97</p>
<p>5.3 The Argument from science: the scientific characterisation of fundamental properties. ……………………………………………………………………………………………..101</p>
<p>5.4 In no categorical terms? ...................................................................................................103</p>
<p>The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Dispositionality ................................. 109</p>
<p>6.1 The Metaphysical Contingency of Categorical Monism................................................109</p>
<p>6.2 Challenging Orthodoxy ....................................................................................................114</p>
<p>6.3 Objections ..........................................................................................................................116</p>
<p>6.4 The modified criterion of dispositionality/categoricality...............................................121</p>
<p>Do Nomic Relations Exist? ................................................................................................. 127</p>
<p>7.1 On the ontological status of nomic relations...................................................................128</p>
<p>7.2 Against DEAL: the case of symmetries and conservation laws ....................................135</p>
<p>7.3 Against DEAL: the ‘constant’ threat ..............................................................................139</p>
7.3.1 Introduction. .............................................................................................................139</p>
<p>7.3.2 Objections to the rescue?.........................................................................................141</p>
<p>7.3.2.1 Objection to Premise (1)......................................................................................141</p>
<p>7.3.2.2 Objection to Premise (2)......................................................................................145</p>
<p>7.3.2.3 Objection to Premise (3)......................................................................................152</p>
<p>Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws ..................................................... 162</p>
8.1 The Modal Status of Laws of Nature...............................................................................162 3</p>
<p>8.1.1 Categorical Monistic Approaches ...........................................................................162</p>
<p>8.1.2 Dispositional Monistic Approaches.........................................................................165</p>
<p>8.1.3 An Argument for the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws ...................................167</p>
<p>8.2 Hybrid Nomic Relations ...................................................................................................171</p>
<p>8.3 The role of hybrid nomic relations in a M-world...........................................................177</p>
<p>Concluding remarks............................................................................................................ 182</p>
References ............................................................................................................................ 185</p>
<p>Index ..................................................................................................................................... 193</p>
<p>Against Dispositional Monism.............................................................................................. 11</p>
<p>1.1 Preliminaries: Two Distinct Issues ....................................................................................11</p>
<p>1.2 The Truthmaking Criterion for the Dispositional/Categorical Distinction ...................12</p>
<p>1.3 Arguing Against Dispositional Monism From the Actual Existence of Fundamental</p>
<p>Categorical Features ........................................................................................................................17</p>
1.3.1 Spatiotemporal Relations as fundamental categorical features .............................18</p>
<p>1.3.1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................18</p>
<p>1.3.1.2 Spatiotemporal Relations and Subjunctive Conditionals in pre-GR theories ..21</p>
<p>1.3.1.3 Bird’s Argument for the Dispositional Essence of Spatiotemporal Relations ..22</p>
<p>1.3.1.4 An Appraisal of the Argument .............................................................................24</p>
<p>1.3.1.5 A Nomic interpretation of Bird’s counterfactual?..............................................31</p>
<p>Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.................................................................... 35</p>
2.1 Identity Theory....................................................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1 Problems for Identity Theory....................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1.1 The objection from the independent variability of dispositionality with respect</p>
<p>to categoricality and vice versa. ..............................................................................................35</p>
<p>2.1.1.2 The one categoricality-multiple dispositionalities problem................................37</p>
<p>2.1.1.3 How can we understand (and justify) the ‘surprising’ triple identity?.............38</p>
<p>2.1.2 A Unique Categoricality? ..........................................................................................43</p>
2.2 Neutral Monism ..................................................................................................................45</p>
<p>2.2.1 Neutral Monism and the Modified Ungrounded Argument...................................45</p>
<p>2.2.2 Agnosticism.................................................................................................................51</p>
<p>In Defence of Categorical Monism....................................................................................... 53</p>
<p>3.1 In defence of the categoricality of fundamental properties: the argument from</p>
<p>renormalisation ................................................................................................................................53</p>
3.2 Objections ............................................................................................................................58</p>
<p>Categorical Monism and Quidditism................................................................................... 63</p>
<p>4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................63</p>
<p>4.2 Versions of RNDV...............................................................................................................65</p>
<p>2</p>
<p>4.3 Defending RNDV ................................................................................................................72</p>
<p>4.3.1 The Permutation Difficulty........................................................................................72</p>
4.3.2 Step 1: Rejecting the Transworld Existence of Fundamental Natural Properties74</p>
<p>4.3.3 Step 2: Adopting the Counterpart Framework .......................................................77</p>
<p>4.3.4 Two Versions of Property-Counterpart Theory Consistent with RNDV..............82</p>
<p>4.3.4.1 PCT1 (First Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory) ...82</p>
<p>4.3.4.2 PCT2 (Second Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory). 84</p>
<p>4.4 RNDV as the unique way of the de re modal representation of fundamental properties ………………………………………………………………………………………………88</p>
<p>Further Objections to Categorical Monism........................................................................ 90</p>
5.1 The Argument from the truthmakers of unmanifested dispositions. .............................90</p>
<p>5.2 The Argument from science: scientific practice. ..............................................................97</p>
<p>5.3 The Argument from science: the scientific characterisation of fundamental properties. ……………………………………………………………………………………………..101</p>
<p>5.4 In no categorical terms? ...................................................................................................103</p>
<p>The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Dispositionality ................................. 109</p>
<p>6.1 The Metaphysical Contingency of Categorical Monism................................................109</p>
<p>6.2 Challenging Orthodoxy ....................................................................................................114</p>
<p>6.3 Objections ..........................................................................................................................116</p>
<p>6.4 The modified criterion of dispositionality/categoricality...............................................121</p>
<p>Do Nomic Relations Exist? ................................................................................................. 127</p>
<p>7.1 On the ontological status of nomic relations...................................................................128</p>
<p>7.2 Against DEAL: the case of symmetries and conservation laws ....................................135</p>
<p>7.3 Against DEAL: the ‘constant’ threat ..............................................................................139</p>
7.3.1 Introduction. .............................................................................................................139</p>
<p>7.3.2 Objections to the rescue?.........................................................................................141</p>
<p>7.3.2.1 Objection to Premise (1)......................................................................................141</p>
<p>7.3.2.2 Objection to Premise (2)......................................................................................145</p>
<p>7.3.2.3 Objection to Premise (3)......................................................................................152</p>
<p>Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws ..................................................... 162</p>
8.1 The Modal Status of Laws of Nature...............................................................................162 3</p>
<p>8.1.1 Categorical Monistic Approaches ...........................................................................162</p>
<p>8.1.2 Dispositional Monistic Approaches.........................................................................165</p>
<p>8.1.3 An Argument for the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws ...................................167</p>
<p>8.2 Hybrid Nomic Relations ...................................................................................................171</p>
<p>8.3 The role of hybrid nomic relations in a M-world...........................................................177</p>
<p>Concluding remarks............................................................................................................ 182</p>
References ............................................................................................................................ 185</p>
<p>Index ..................................................................................................................................... 193</p>