The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic

<div>Part I: The Pragmatist Basis</div><div>Chapter 1. Pragmatism and Metaphysics: The General Background</div><div>1. Metaphysics</div><div>2. The conceptual articulation of reality</div><div>3. Assertion</div><div>4. Propositions and the formality of logic</div><div>5. Arguments, inferences and argumentations</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 2. Groundbreaking Principles</div><div>1. Five principles</div><div>2. Two models of propositional individuation</div><div>3. Propositional identification</div><div>4. Logical propositions</div><div>5. Logic as a science</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 3. Semantic and Pragmatic Hints in Frege's Logical Theory</div><div>1. Frege’s projects</div><div>2. The representation of abstract reality</div><div>3. The analysis of discourse</div><div>4. Two-factor semantics and the meaning of identity</div><div>5. Special notions</div><div><br></div><div>Part II: Logical Constants</div><div>Chapter 4. Implying, Precluding, and Quantifying Over: Frege's Logical Expressivism</div><div>1. Logical expressivism</div><div>2. The conditional and negation</div><div>3. Negation, incompatibility, falsehood</div><div>4. Expressions of quantity and relations between concepts</div><br><div>Chapter 5. Lessons from Inferentialism and Invariantism</div><div>1. What is the issue with logical constants?</div><div>2. Analytically valid arguments</div><div>3. Inferentialist approaches</div><div>4. The Erlangen programme</div><div>5. Invariant terms of logic</div>6. A pragmatist excursus<div><br></div><div>Chapter 6. The Inference-Marker View of Logical Notions: What a Pragmatism Proposal Looks Like</div><div>1. The proposal</div><div>2. Some consequences of (IMV)</div><div>3. Inferential significance</div><div>4. Genuine logical notions</div><br><div>Part III: Further Applications of Propositional Priority</div><div>Chapter 7. Grue, Tonk, and Russell's Paradox: What Follows from the Principle of Propositional Priority?</div><div>1. Paradoxes</div><div>2. Goodman’s ‘grue’</div><div>3. Prior’s ‘tonk’</div><div>4. Russell’s paradox</div>5. Taking stock<div><br></div><div>Chapter 8. Visual Arguments: What is at Issue in the Multimodality Debate?</div><div>1. Multiple modes</div><div>2. Non-linguistic aspects of linguistic communication</div><div>3. Sentences, pictures, and relational linguistic pragmatism</div><div>4. Affordances</div>5. Ineffability and conceptual articulation<div>6. Visual thinking in mathematics</div><div>7. Some conclusions</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 9. Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski</div><div>1. The scope of Tarski’s proposal</div><div>2. Physicalism and the unity of science</div>3. Correspondence and deflationism<div>4. Satisfaction</div><div>5. Frege on truth and judgeable contents</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 10. Truth Ascriptions as Prosentences: Further Lessons of the Principle of Propositional Priority</div><div>1. Why truth is so elusive</div><div>2. The pragmatist strategy: Truth ascriptions and the Fregean Principle of Context</div><div>3. Proforms</div><div>4. Pragmatism, expressivism, and the priority of the proposition</div><div>5. The prosentential approach to truth</div><div>6. Truth and assertion</div><div><br></div>