Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics

<div>Foreword</div><div>Preface</div><div>Acknowledgement</div><div><br></div><div>Part I. Time</div><div>1. "Thank Goodness that’s Over” Revisited</div><div>1.1 Prior’s Puzzle and the Two Views about the Nature of Time</div><div>1.2 Responses to Prior’s Puzzle</div><div>1.3 A Riposte</div><div>1.4 Concluding Remarks</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>2. Experience and Time</div><div>2.1 Justifying our Bias towards the Present</div><div>2.2 Value and the Metaphysics of Time</div><div>2.3 Concluding Remarks</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>3. Max Black and Backward Causation</div><div>3.1 Black’s Main Claim</div><div>3.2 Black’s Two Arguments</div><div>3.3 Analysing Black’s Arguments</div><div>References</div><br><div>4. Dummett on Reasons to Act and Bringing about the Past</div><div>4.1 Introduction</div><div>4.2 Dissecting Dummett’s Argument</div><div>4.3 The Second Sceptical Argument</div><div>4.4 The Third Sceptical Argument</div><div>4.5 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>5. Dummett on McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time</div><div>5.1 Introduction</div><div>5.2 McTaggart’s Argument</div><div>5.3 Temporal versus Spatial Immersion</div><div>5.4 Observer-independence</div><div>References</div><br><div>6. A Note on the Grandfather Paradox</div><div>6.1 Lewis’s Theory</div><div>6.2 Against Lewis’s Theory</div><div>6.3 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>7. Bulletproof Grandfathers, David Lewis, and ‘Can’t’-Judgements</div><div>7.1 A General Argument</div><div>7.2 Misapplied Contextualism</div><div>7.3 A Time Symmetry Argument</div><div>7.4 Alternative Arguments</div><div>7.5 Concluding Remarks</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>8. A Dilemma for Eternalists</div><div>8.1 Introduction</div><div>8.2 The Dilemma</div><div>8.3 Some Options</div><div>8.4 An Upshot</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>Part II. Identity</div><div>9. Identity and Extrinsicness</div><div>9.1 Introduction</div><div>9.2 Setting Up the Problem</div><div>9.3 Mackie on Best-Candidate Theories of Identity</div><div>9.4 Assessing Mackie</div><div>9.5 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>10. Best Candidate Theories and Identity</div><div>10.1 Introduction</div><div>10.2 Best-Candidate Theories of Identity</div><div>10.3 Brennan’s Interpretation</div><div>10.4 Assessing Brennan’s Response</div><div>10.5 Final Words</div><div>References</div><div><br></div>11 PossibleWorlds and Identity<div>11.1 Introduction</div><div>11.2 Forbes’s Cases</div><div>11.3 On Forbes’s Grounded Transworld Identities</div><div>11.4 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>12. Vague Identity and Vague Objects</div><div>12.1 Getting Clear about the Vague Identity Thesis</div><div>12.2 Considering The Ship of Theseus</div><div>12.3 Evans’s Proof</div><div>12.4 Responses to Evans’s Proof</div><div>12.5 The Correct Response to Evans’s Proof</div><div>12.6 A General Result</div><div>12.7 Conclusion</div>References<div><br></div><div>13. More on Rigidity and Scope</div><div>13.1 More’s Thesis</div><div>13.2 More’s Arguments</div><div>13.3 Why More’s Arguments Fail</div><div>13.4 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><br><div>14. Enduring Endurantism</div><div>14.1 Barker and Dowe’s First Argument</div><div>14.2 Barker and Dowe’s Second Argument</div><div>14.3 Barker and Dowe’s Third Argument</div><div>14.4 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>15. Identity of Truth-Conditions</div><div>15.1 Analysis Problem no. 19</div><div>15.2 The Solution</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>Part III. The Self</div><div>16. Some Notes on Animalism</div><div>16.1 Animalism</div><div>16.2 Why Animalism is True</div><div>16.3 Why Animalism can’t be True</div><div>16.4 A Familiar Analogy</div><div>16.5 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>17. Persons and Human Beings</div><div>17.1 The Lockean Conception of Person</div><div>17.2 The Animal Attribute Conception of Persons</div><div>17.3 Evaluating the Two Conceptions of Persons</div><div>17.4 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>18. The Story of ‘I’: Comments on Rudder-Baker’s Constitution View of Persons</div><div>18.1 Introduction</div><div>18.2 Rudder-Baker on Self-Consciousness and the First-Person</div><div>18.3 Rudder-Baker on the First-Person Perspective</div><div>18.4 A General Worry about Rudder-Baker’s View</div><div>18.5 Rudder-Baker on Personal Identity</div><div>18.6 Rudder-Baker on the Determinancy of Personal Identity</div><div>18.7 Rudder-Baker on Human Persons</div>References<div><br></div><div>19. Personal Identity and Extrinsicness</div><div>19.1 Introduction</div><div>19.2 Wiggins on the Case of Division</div><div>19.3 The Challenge of Division</div><div>19.4 Best-Candidate Theories and the “Only a and b” Condition</div><div>19.5 Extrinsicness of Personal Identity</div><div>19.6 Concluding Remarks</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>20. Personal Identity and Reductionism</div><div>20.1 Introduction</div><div>20.2 What Ontological Reduction Is</div><div>20.3 Ontological Reduction of Persons</div><div>20.4 Reductionism and What Matters</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>21. Bermúdez on Self-Consciousness</div><div>21.1 Introduction</div><div>21.2 Self-consciousness, ‘I’-thoughts, and the Deflationary Theory</div><div>21.3 Critique</div><div>21.4 Conclusion and Further Work</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>22. Anscombe on ‘I’</div><div>22.1 Introduction</div><div>22.2 Anscombe’s Challenge</div><div>22.3 The Tank Argument</div><div>22.4 Supporting the Referential View</div>References<div><br></div><div>23. Wittgenstein on the First-Person</div><div>23.1 The Problem with ‘I’-Judgements</div><div>23.2 Wittgenstein on the Two Uses of ‘I’</div><div>23.3 Analysing Wittgenstein’s View</div><div>23.4 The ‘I’-as-subject and Self-Consciousness</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>24. Persons and Values</div><div>24.1 Theories of Values and the Definition of ‘Person’</div><div>24.2 The Case of Derek Parfit</div><div>24.3 Two Theses about Personal Identity and What Matters</div><div>24.4 The Argument from Analysis</div><div>24.5 The Argument from Division</div><div>24.6 The Argument from Reductionism</div><div>24.7 Conclusion</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>Part IV. Afterthoughts</div><div>25. About Time</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>26. Affecting the Past</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>27. Of Identity</div><div>References</div><div><br></div><div>28. On Personal Identity</div><div>References</div><br><div>Index</div>