Sosa
John Wiley & Sons
0e druk, 2003
9781405108508
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind
Specificaties
Paperback, 400 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
0e druk, 2003
ISBN13: 9781405108508
Rubricering
Onderdeel van serie
Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen
Samenvatting
Philosophy of Mind includes papers by leading philosophers that explore topics such as experience and its representational and qualitative content; subjectivity; causal relevance; a new a priorist argument against materialism; phenomenal color; and other topics across the spectrum of philosophy of mind.
A collection of original papers by top scholars, edited by two eminent philosophers.
Explores a broad range of topics from across the spectrum of philosophy of mind.
Includes essays that cover experience and its representational and qualitative content; subjectivity; causal relevance; a new a priorist argument against materialism, and phenomenal color.
Specificaties
ISBN13:9781405108508
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:paperback
Aantal pagina's:400
Uitgever:John Wiley & Sons
Druk:0
Inhoudsopgave
1. Who′s Afraid of Disjunctive Properties?: Louise Antony (Ohio State University).
<p>2. A Trilemma for Redeployment: Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia University).</p>
<p>3. The Normativity of Content: Paul A. Boghossian (New York University).</p>
<p>4. The Nature of Narrow Content: David J. Chalmers (University of Arizona).</p>
<p>5. Experience as Representation: Fred Dretske (Duke University).</p>
<p>6. Thoughts and Norms: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).</p>
<p>7. Representation and Narrow Belief: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).</p>
<p>8. Qualia, Properties, Modality: Brian Loar (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>9. Vs. a New A Priorist Argument for Dualism: William G. Lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).</p>
<p>10. What Constitutes the Mind–Body Problem?: Colin McGinn (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>11. A Naturalist–Phnomenal Realist Response to Block′s Harder Problem: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>12. Could There Be A Science of Consciousness?: David Papineau (University of London).</p>
<p>13. Looks as Powers: Philip Pettit (Princeton University).</p>
<p>14. Content, Character and Color: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).</p>
<p>15. What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?: Galen Strawson (University of Reading).</p>
<p>16. Causal Relevance: Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)</p>
<p>2. A Trilemma for Redeployment: Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia University).</p>
<p>3. The Normativity of Content: Paul A. Boghossian (New York University).</p>
<p>4. The Nature of Narrow Content: David J. Chalmers (University of Arizona).</p>
<p>5. Experience as Representation: Fred Dretske (Duke University).</p>
<p>6. Thoughts and Norms: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).</p>
<p>7. Representation and Narrow Belief: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).</p>
<p>8. Qualia, Properties, Modality: Brian Loar (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>9. Vs. a New A Priorist Argument for Dualism: William G. Lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).</p>
<p>10. What Constitutes the Mind–Body Problem?: Colin McGinn (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>11. A Naturalist–Phnomenal Realist Response to Block′s Harder Problem: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).</p>
<p>12. Could There Be A Science of Consciousness?: David Papineau (University of London).</p>
<p>13. Looks as Powers: Philip Pettit (Princeton University).</p>
<p>14. Content, Character and Color: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).</p>
<p>15. What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?: Galen Strawson (University of Reading).</p>
<p>16. Causal Relevance: Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)</p>