J Dreier
John Wiley & Sons
e druk, 2005
9781405101790
Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory
Specificaties
Paperback, 352 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
e druk, 2005
ISBN13: 9781405101790
Rubricering
Onderdeel van serie
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen
Samenvatting
Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory features pairs of newly commissioned essays by some of the leading theorists working in the field today.
Brings together fresh debates on the most controversial issues in moral theory
Questions include: Are moral requirements derived from reason? How demanding is morality? Are virtues the proper starting point for moral theorizing?
Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion.
Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary moral theory, while also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
Notes on Contributors.
<p>Introduction James Dreier.</p>
<p>Part I: Normative Theory.</p>
<p>Is the rightness of action determined by the value of consequences?.</p>
<p>1. The Consequentialist Perspective: William Shaw.</p>
<p>2. Against Maximizing Act–Consequentialism: Peter Vallentyne.</p>
<p>3. Reasons with Demands: Rethinking Rightness: Alastair Norcross.</p>
<p>Can contract theory ground morality?.</p>
<p>4. Moral Contractarianism as a Foundation for Interpersonal Morality: Samuel Freeman.</p>
<p>5. Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?: Philip Pettit.</p>
<p>Are the virtues the proper starting point for ethical theory?.</p>
<p>6. Are virtues the proper starting point for morality?: Rosalind Hursthouse.</p>
<p>7. Virtue theory: Julia Driver.</p>
<p>Part II: Reason and Motivation.</p>
<p>Are moral requirements derived from reason?.</p>
<p>8. Reason, Sentiment, and Categorical Imperatives: Samuel J. Kerstein.</p>
<p>9. Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?: Simon Blackburn.</p>
<p>Is motivation internal to moral judgment?.</p>
<p>10. How do moral judgments motivate? : Sigrún Svavarsdóttir.</p>
<p>11. Moral Motivation: R. Jay Wallace.</p>
<p>Part III: Moral Facts and Explanations.</p>
<p>Is morality fully factual?.</p>
<p>12. Moral Factualism: Peter Railton.</p>
<p>13. Morality without Moral Facts: Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons.</p>
<p>Do moral facts and properties explain anything?.</p>
<p>14. Moral Explanations Defended: Nicholas L. Sturgeon.</p>
<p>15. Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint: Nick Zangwill.</p>
<p>Are there general moral principles?.</p>
<p>16. Ethical Generality and Moral Judgment: Robert Audi.</p>
<p>17. Defending Moral Particularism: Mark Lance and Margaret O. Little.</p>
<p>Index of Subjects.</p>
<p>Index of Names</p>
<p>Introduction James Dreier.</p>
<p>Part I: Normative Theory.</p>
<p>Is the rightness of action determined by the value of consequences?.</p>
<p>1. The Consequentialist Perspective: William Shaw.</p>
<p>2. Against Maximizing Act–Consequentialism: Peter Vallentyne.</p>
<p>3. Reasons with Demands: Rethinking Rightness: Alastair Norcross.</p>
<p>Can contract theory ground morality?.</p>
<p>4. Moral Contractarianism as a Foundation for Interpersonal Morality: Samuel Freeman.</p>
<p>5. Can Contract Theory Ground Morality?: Philip Pettit.</p>
<p>Are the virtues the proper starting point for ethical theory?.</p>
<p>6. Are virtues the proper starting point for morality?: Rosalind Hursthouse.</p>
<p>7. Virtue theory: Julia Driver.</p>
<p>Part II: Reason and Motivation.</p>
<p>Are moral requirements derived from reason?.</p>
<p>8. Reason, Sentiment, and Categorical Imperatives: Samuel J. Kerstein.</p>
<p>9. Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?: Simon Blackburn.</p>
<p>Is motivation internal to moral judgment?.</p>
<p>10. How do moral judgments motivate? : Sigrún Svavarsdóttir.</p>
<p>11. Moral Motivation: R. Jay Wallace.</p>
<p>Part III: Moral Facts and Explanations.</p>
<p>Is morality fully factual?.</p>
<p>12. Moral Factualism: Peter Railton.</p>
<p>13. Morality without Moral Facts: Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons.</p>
<p>Do moral facts and properties explain anything?.</p>
<p>14. Moral Explanations Defended: Nicholas L. Sturgeon.</p>
<p>15. Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint: Nick Zangwill.</p>
<p>Are there general moral principles?.</p>
<p>16. Ethical Generality and Moral Judgment: Robert Audi.</p>
<p>17. Defending Moral Particularism: Mark Lance and Margaret O. Little.</p>
<p>Index of Subjects.</p>
<p>Index of Names</p>