Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science
Samenvatting
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science contains sixteen original essays by leading authors in the philosophy of science, each one defending the affirmative or negative answer to one of eight specific questions, including: Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?
Brings together fresh debates on eight of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of science.
Questions addressed include: Are there laws of social science? ; Are causes physically connected to their effects? ; Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?
Each question is treated by a pair of opposing essays written by eminent scholars, and especially commissioned for the volume.
Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion.
Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
<p>Preface</p>
<p>Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?</p>
<p>Part I: Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?</p>
<p>1. Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism<br />James Robert Brown, University of Toronto</p>
<p>2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism<br />John Norton, University of Pittsburgh</p>
<p>Part II: Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?</p>
<p>3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation<br />Patrick Maher, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign</p>
<p>4. Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification<br />Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University and Clark Glymour, Carnegie Mellon University</p>
<p>Part III: Can a Theory′s Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?</p>
<p>5. A Theory′s Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates<br />Jarrett Leplin, University of North Carolina, Greensboro</p>
<p>6. A Theory′s Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates<br />André Kukla, University of Toronto and Joel Walmsley, University of Toronto</p>
<p>Part IV: Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?</p>
<p>7. There are no Laws in the Social Sciences<br />John Roberts, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill</p>
<p>8. There are Laws in the Social Sciences<br />Harold Kincaid, University of Alabama at Birmingham</p>
<p>Part V: Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?</p>
<p>9. Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes<br />Phil Dowe, University of Queensland, Australia</p>
<p>10. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation<br />Jonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts, Amherst</p>
<p>Part VI: Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past?</p>
<p>11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why There is Still a Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past<br />Huw Price, University of Edinburgh</p>
<p>12. There is No Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past<br />Craig Callender</p>
<p>Part VII: Do Genes Encode Information About Phenotypic Traits</p>
<p>13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits<br />Sahotra Sarkar, University of Texas at Austin</p>
<p>14. Genes Do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits<br />Peter Godfrey–Smith, Stanford University</p>
<p>Part VIII: Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?</p>
<p>15. The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection<br />Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland</p>
<p>16. The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural Selection<br />Fiona Cowie, California Institute of Technology and James Woodward, California Institute of Technology</p>
<p>Index</p>