E Sosa
John Wiley & Sons
0e druk, 2012
9781118545324
Philosophical Issues V22 – Action Theory
Action Theory
Specificaties
Paperback, 300 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
0e druk, 2012
ISBN13: 9781118545324
Rubricering
Onderdeel van serie
Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous
Levertijd ongeveer 15 werkdagen
Samenvatting
This is a collection of papers on action theory, very broadly conceived. It contains cutting–edge work by some of the most important contributors in the field.
Specificaties
ISBN13:9781118545324
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:paperback
Aantal pagina's:300
Uitgever:John Wiley & Sons
Druk:0
Inhoudsopgave
Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability
<br /> JESUS H. AGUILAR
<br />
<br /> Self–Defeating Self–Governance
<br /> CHRISOULA ANDREOU
<br />
<br /> Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action
<br /> JOHN A. BARKER ANDFRED ADAMS
<br />
<br /> Exercising Control in Practical Reasoning: Problems for Naturalism about Agency
<br /> JOHN BISHOP
<br />
<br /> Time, Rationality, and Self–Governance
<br /> MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
<br />
<br /> An Action Theoretic Problem for Intralevel Mental Causation
<br /> ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF
<br />
<br /> Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?
<br /> RUTH CHANG
<br />
<br /> What is an Omission?
<br /> RANDOLPH CLARKE
<br />
<br /> Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality
<br /> LUCA FERRERO
<br />
<br /> Responsibility and Autonomy: The Problem of Mission Creep
<br /> JOHN MARTIN FISCHER
<br />
<br /> Free Will and Rational Coherency
<br /> PATRICIA GREENSPAN
<br />
<br /> Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason
<br /> ISHTIYAQUE HAJI
<br />
<br /> Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency
<br /> BENNETT W. HELM
<br />
<br /> Actions and Activity
<br /> JENNIFER HORNSBY
<br />
<br /> Making Decisions
<br /> HUGH J. MCCANN
<br />
<br /> Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers
<br /> MICHAEL MCKENNA
<br />
<br /> Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action
<br /> ALFRED R. MELE
<br />
<br /> Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection
<br /> DERK PEREBOOM
<br />
<br /> The Norms of Acceptance
<br /> JOELLE PROUST
<br />
<br /> On the Relation Between Wanting and Willing
<br /> TAMAR SCHAPIRO
<br />
<br /> Action Explanation and the Free Will Debate: How Incompatibilist Arguments Go Wrong
<br /> SCOTT SEHON
<br />
<br /> Using Moral Principles to Guide Decisions
<br /> HOLLY SMITH
<br />
<br /> Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)
<br /> MICHAEL SMITH
<br />
<br /> Group Reasons
<br /> RAIMO TUOMELA
<br />
<br /> Why the Luck Problem Isn t
<br /> MANUEL VARGAS
<br /> JESUS H. AGUILAR
<br />
<br /> Self–Defeating Self–Governance
<br /> CHRISOULA ANDREOU
<br />
<br /> Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action
<br /> JOHN A. BARKER ANDFRED ADAMS
<br />
<br /> Exercising Control in Practical Reasoning: Problems for Naturalism about Agency
<br /> JOHN BISHOP
<br />
<br /> Time, Rationality, and Self–Governance
<br /> MICHAEL E. BRATMAN
<br />
<br /> An Action Theoretic Problem for Intralevel Mental Causation
<br /> ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF
<br />
<br /> Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?
<br /> RUTH CHANG
<br />
<br /> What is an Omission?
<br /> RANDOLPH CLARKE
<br />
<br /> Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality
<br /> LUCA FERRERO
<br />
<br /> Responsibility and Autonomy: The Problem of Mission Creep
<br /> JOHN MARTIN FISCHER
<br />
<br /> Free Will and Rational Coherency
<br /> PATRICIA GREENSPAN
<br />
<br /> Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason
<br /> ISHTIYAQUE HAJI
<br />
<br /> Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency
<br /> BENNETT W. HELM
<br />
<br /> Actions and Activity
<br /> JENNIFER HORNSBY
<br />
<br /> Making Decisions
<br /> HUGH J. MCCANN
<br />
<br /> Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers
<br /> MICHAEL MCKENNA
<br />
<br /> Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action
<br /> ALFRED R. MELE
<br />
<br /> Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection
<br /> DERK PEREBOOM
<br />
<br /> The Norms of Acceptance
<br /> JOELLE PROUST
<br />
<br /> On the Relation Between Wanting and Willing
<br /> TAMAR SCHAPIRO
<br />
<br /> Action Explanation and the Free Will Debate: How Incompatibilist Arguments Go Wrong
<br /> SCOTT SEHON
<br />
<br /> Using Moral Principles to Guide Decisions
<br /> HOLLY SMITH
<br />
<br /> Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)
<br /> MICHAEL SMITH
<br />
<br /> Group Reasons
<br /> RAIMO TUOMELA
<br />
<br /> Why the Luck Problem Isn t
<br /> MANUEL VARGAS