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Preventing Regulatory Capture

Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it

Specificaties
Gebonden, 530 blz. | Engels
Cambridge University Press | e druk, 2013
ISBN13: 9781107036086
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Cambridge University Press e druk, 2013 9781107036086
€ 92,65
Levertijd ongeveer 8 werkdagen

Samenvatting

When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed and may in fact be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform.

Specificaties

ISBN13:9781107036086
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:Gebonden
Aantal pagina's:530

Inhoudsopgave

Introduction Daniel Carpenter and David Moss; Part I. Failures of Capture Scholarship: 1. A revisionist history of regulatory capture William Novak; 2. The concept of regulatory capture: a short, inglorious history Richard Posner; 3. Detecting and measuring capture Daniel Carpenter; Part II. New Conceptions of Capture - Mechanisms and Outcomes: 4. Cultural capture and the financial crisis James Kwak; 5. Complexity, capacity, and capture Nolan McCarty; 6. Preventing economists' capture Luigi Zingales; 7. Corrosive capture? The dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation Daniel Carpenter; Part III. Misdiagnosing Capture and Case Studies of Regulatory Success: 8. Capturing history: the case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 David Moss and Jonathan Lackow; 9. Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture: evidence from coal mine safety regulation Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer; 10. Captured by disaster? Reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill Christopher Carrigan; 11. Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking Susan Webb Yackee; 12. Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar; Part IV. The Possibility of Preventing Capture: 13. Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs: some evidence from insurance regulation Daniel Schwarcz; 14. Courts and regulatory capture M. Elizabeth Magill; 15. Can executive review help prevent capture? Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore; Conclusion David Moss and Daniel Carpenter; Afterword Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach.
€ 92,65
Levertijd ongeveer 8 werkdagen

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        Preventing Regulatory Capture