MW Baron
John Wiley & Sons
e druk, 1997
9780631194347
Three Methods of Ethics – A Debate
A Debate
Specificaties
Gebonden, 296 blz.
|
Engels
John Wiley & Sons |
e druk, 1997
ISBN13: 9780631194347
Rubricering
Onderdeel van serie
Great Debates in Philosophy
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen
Samenvatting
During the past decade ethical theory has been in a lively state of development, and three basic approaches to ethics – Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics – have assumed positions of particular prominence.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
Introduction.
<p>Part I: Kantian Ethics. (Marcia Baron).</p>
<p>1. Introduction.</p>
<p>2. Consequentalism versus Kantian Ethics.</p>
<p>3. Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>4. Further Objections to Kantian Ethics.</p>
<p>Part II: The Consequentialist Perspective. (Philip Pettit).</p>
<p>5. A Moral Psychology for Consequentialists and Non–consequentialists.</p>
<p>6. The Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>7. Different Answers to the Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>8. In Favour of the Consequentialist Answer to the Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>9. The Tenability of the Consequentialist Answer.</p>
<p>Part III: Virtue Ethics. (Michael Slote).</p>
<p>10. What is Virtue Ethics?.</p>
<p>11. Theory versus Anti–theory.</p>
<p>12. Virtue Ethics versus Kantian and Common–sense Morality.</p>
<p>13. Common–sense Virtue Ethics versus Consequentialism.</p>
<p>14. Further Aspects of Common–sense virtual Ethics.</p>
<p>15. Making Sense of Agent–based Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>16. Morality as Inner Strength.</p>
<p>17. Morality as Universal Benevolence.</p>
<p>18. Morality as Caring.</p>
<p>19. Agent–basing and Applied Ethics.</p>
<p>20. Conclusion: Comparisons within Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>Part IV: Reply to Pettit and Slote. (Marcia Baron).</p>
<p>21. Reply to Pettit.</p>
<p>22. Reply to Stote.</p>
<p>Part V: Reply to Baron and Stote. (Phillip Pettit).</p>
<p>23. Rival Theories?.</p>
<p>24. Comment on Slote.</p>
<p>25. Comment on Baron.</p>
<p>Part VI: Reply to Baron and Pettit. (Michael Slote).</p>
<p>26. Reply to Baron.</p>
<p>27. Reply to Pettit.</p>
<p>28. Virtue Politics.</p>
<p>Index.</p>
<p>Part I: Kantian Ethics. (Marcia Baron).</p>
<p>1. Introduction.</p>
<p>2. Consequentalism versus Kantian Ethics.</p>
<p>3. Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>4. Further Objections to Kantian Ethics.</p>
<p>Part II: The Consequentialist Perspective. (Philip Pettit).</p>
<p>5. A Moral Psychology for Consequentialists and Non–consequentialists.</p>
<p>6. The Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>7. Different Answers to the Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>8. In Favour of the Consequentialist Answer to the Question of Rightness.</p>
<p>9. The Tenability of the Consequentialist Answer.</p>
<p>Part III: Virtue Ethics. (Michael Slote).</p>
<p>10. What is Virtue Ethics?.</p>
<p>11. Theory versus Anti–theory.</p>
<p>12. Virtue Ethics versus Kantian and Common–sense Morality.</p>
<p>13. Common–sense Virtue Ethics versus Consequentialism.</p>
<p>14. Further Aspects of Common–sense virtual Ethics.</p>
<p>15. Making Sense of Agent–based Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>16. Morality as Inner Strength.</p>
<p>17. Morality as Universal Benevolence.</p>
<p>18. Morality as Caring.</p>
<p>19. Agent–basing and Applied Ethics.</p>
<p>20. Conclusion: Comparisons within Virtue Ethics.</p>
<p>Part IV: Reply to Pettit and Slote. (Marcia Baron).</p>
<p>21. Reply to Pettit.</p>
<p>22. Reply to Stote.</p>
<p>Part V: Reply to Baron and Stote. (Phillip Pettit).</p>
<p>23. Rival Theories?.</p>
<p>24. Comment on Slote.</p>
<p>25. Comment on Baron.</p>
<p>Part VI: Reply to Baron and Pettit. (Michael Slote).</p>
<p>26. Reply to Baron.</p>
<p>27. Reply to Pettit.</p>
<p>28. Virtue Politics.</p>
<p>Index.</p>
